In the Revolutionary Community as, "The Republic of New Afrika vs. the Re-Actionary United snakes of amerikkka". In this case, the state was claiming that a "Criminal Enterprise" existed and that you are a part of it.They claim the "Criminal Enterprise" was responsible for what they called Bank robberies, armored truck robberies, murder of policemen, wounding policemen, kidnapping policemen,kidnapping drug dealers (some of whom turn out to be FBI agents), and kidnapping prison guards, etc...... The Shakur Family is a family from the East Coast, the head of the Family was El Hajj Sallahudin Shakur. We affectionately called him Abba, which means Father. He was physically the father of two of the Panther leaders on the East Coast, Zayd Malik Shakur and Lumumba Abdul Shakur. There were very few of us in the Movement that had fathers in the Movement. El Hajj Sallahudin Shakur was an associate of El Hajj Malik Shabazz (Malcolm X), he was a member of the Muslim Mosque Incorporated and also a member of the Organization of Afro-American Unity. He made Hajj one year after Malcolm. As we were coming up Abba was at the top.
We aspired to be like him. I became closely associated with Lumumba Abdul Shakur and I began to refer to El Hajj Sallahudin Shakur as Abba, too. As if he was my father and Abba accepted that. He accepted all of us who related to him, as his children and he was a father to us as much as he could be. He gave guidance, he gave us an understanding because he was a Muslim, he gave us an understanding of what it meant to be Muslim, as far as standing up for justice. For advocating justice and for fighting for what was right for our people. He had an understanding that anyone who is oppressed like this regardless of who it is, Muslims need to fight for them and since it is us ourselves, then for sure we need to be involved in as much struggle for our liberation and organizing as possible. A lot of people just saw religion as a way, not to be in the struggle. He gave us the understanding that to be in Islam, was the way to be in the struggle. He was also a Pan-Africanist, he worked, had property and lived part of the time in Africa. The family had property and business in Ghana and he was a business man. He taught us all to be self-sufficient. He had money, he showed us you could hustle, make money legally, and still he didn''t have to let the jewnited Snakes Government or white people in general know what his personal business was. That was a very important lesson we learned from El Hajj Sallahudin Shakur.
Abba was our father. There were many people on the east coast who were involved in not only the Black Panther Party, but other organizations around at that time that gravitated towards El Hajj Sallahudin Shakur. The Shakur family is all of those young brothers and sisters who were involved in struggle, not all were Muslim, but the majority were Muslim. It may have been at one time maybe 50 of us. A lot of people who weren't part of The Shakur family, the police would refer to them as Shakur anyway, because it was a big group and the influence was felt by many people who were not a part, but wanted to be down with us. Afeni Shakur, joined the party and then she was married to Lumumba Abdul Shakur for a few years. They were both part of the New York 21 case. So when she married Lumumba Abdul Shakur, that made her part of the Shakur family, then she legally changed her name to Shakur. Even after her and Lumumba broke up, she kept the name. Later on her and Mutulu Shakur were married. Mutulu Shakur was a younger brother in the same area where they lived in Jamaica Queens, who had adopted the Revolutionary lifestyle when he was about 14 or 15.
He was a legionnaire. He was involved in the first big shoot out at New Bethel Church in Detroit. At the Second Annual Convention of the Republic of New Afrika. There was a shoot out when the police assaulted that gathering. Mutulu was one of the legionnaires at the time in the military forces of the Republic of New Afrika, that was responsible for and actually defended the lives of many of our leaders that were there. A lot of them owe it to Mutulu for his level of discipline in saving their lives. Baba Herman Ferguson and Mama Iyaluah Ferguson were directly protected by Mutulu when things broke out. These are some of the figures that were members of the Shakur Family. Three of them that I named were directly involved in Tupac's life..... Assata Shakur became part of the family when Abba adopted Assata like he did the rest of us. It wasn''t through marriage, a lot of people who were attracted to our lifestyle of work and our style of living, accepted the name Shakur.
Formerly she was known as Joanne Chesimard, she became part of the family. Around the time of her arrest, that's when I first remember her using the name Assata Shakur, in ''73..... In 1977, Assata Shakur was convicted by an all- white jury and sentenced to life plus 33 years in prison. In 1979, fearing that she would be murdered in prison, and knowing that she would never receive any justice, Assata Shakur was liberated from prison, aided by committed comrades who understood the depths of the injustices in her case, and who were also extremely fearful for her life.Describe The soul of the Black Liberation Army (BLA), an underground, paramilitary Love and Revolutionary Greetings!
Thursday, April 18, 2013
Wednesday, April 17, 2013
Carl Hampton of Peoples Party II (Assassination)
Rev Greetings Haki Kweli Shaku i would like to send my fullest clench fist love to this great man that was sent to us and then took away from us from a pig and governmental collaborative efforts, im bringin this forth in my blog to show love to one of the non talked about organizers of our peoples liberation movements. He took what he learned at a fast paste from the westside oakland california down south To Houston, Texas and the south and created another chapter of the panthers(Peoples Party II). He was no doubt the fred hampton of the south and to the third ward New Afrikan communities as you will read in this blog and story.. May The ancestors be satisified with your life and sacrifice brother Carl Hampton 21 gunz Zalute:
On July 26, 1970, Carl Bernard Hampton, one of Black America's most articulate, courageous and heroic, young leaders was ruthlessly slain by the Houston Police Department's Central Intelligence Division (CID). At the age of 21, Carl was a tireless organizer who worked day and night to establish People's Party II[1], a Black revolutionary group modeled after the Black Panther Party (BPP). Armed with determination to see his people free from the oppression, exploitation and degradation by a racist and corrupt system bent on the destruction of Blacks and people of color, he proceeded boldly with his mission. Consistently, he rallied people around the issue of police brutality and murder that was quite prevalent at that time. Speaking with much power and authority, he was able to capture the hearts and minds of the people and therefore, their respect and admiration. Seeing the effects his words and actions were having on the community, it would be only a matter of time before the government would move in to "neutralize" him.
The 2800 block of Dowling Street was known for its illicit activities of alcohol, drugs, prostitution and killings. Undaunted by threats on his life, Carl continued to organize within the infamous section of Houston's Black community, the Third Ward. Intensely sensitive to the poverty in the area and seeing people suffer as a result, Carl's immediate concern was to provide decent clothing and food to the many needy people who resided there. It was during his effort to obtain supplies for these programs that destiny would soon usher in events that would seal his fate. It all began on a hot and humid summer afternoon, July 17, 1970. Carl would be returning from a trip home back to the Headquarters of People's Party II (PPII). Upon arriving and stepping out of the car, he noticed two uniform patrolmen harassing a young brother who had been selling the "Black Panther Newspaper" on the street curb in front of the Headquarters. He approached the officer and inquired about the nature of the problem. Carl was wearing an unconcealed .45 automatic pistol strapped across his chest in a shoulder holster (legal at that time). The police officer, startled at seeing a young Black man openly wearing a pistol, immediately withdrew his attention from the initial cause of being there. He then confronted Carl and questioned him as to why he was wearing a gun. Carl responded by telling him he had a constitutional right to bear arms. Again shocked and infuriated by this reply, the officer began reaching for his gun. Seeing this, Carl instinctively drew his gun from his holster, beating the police to the draw. At that same moment, two members in the community center emerged with weapons to join in the confrontation. The driver of the patrol car quickly radioed for back up.
Realizing that it was a standoff and it would only be a matter of minutes before the area would be sealed off and police reinforcements arrive, Carl and the other members cautiously backed into the office to barricade themselves. Feeling somewhat fortified at the back of the office and looking out the windows, they could see increasing police presence, dressed in riot gear darting to and fro to position themselves behind cars and buildings. With tensions escalating, a commanding officer of the Houston Police Dept. entered the office doors in an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate for them to surrender. Rather than be taken to jail, Carl felt his chances would be better out on the street, having his lawyer negotiate terms for surrender. His reluctance to be arrested was due to the numerous cases of police brutality and murder of Blacks in the jails and on the street during that time. The negotiating officer quickly exited the doors after seeing no sign of compromise.
Meanwhile, a large crowd of people out on the streets who witnessed the incident began to congregate in front of the office. So enraged were they at the hostile police presence that they offered themselves as a shield between the PPII members and the trigger-happy police. In fact, the crowd was so confident and protective that they dared police to fire on PPII Headquarters. This being an unexpected situation and the police not knowing how to properly deal with it, decided to retreat from the area and develop a contingency plan. Thus followed a sense of victory in the peoples' ability to back down the Police Dept. By this time, most of Houston became aware of the standoff between PPII and the Houston Police Dept. because of news flashes. People from all over the city's Black communities poured into the 2800 block of Dowling Street to offer support. Many brothers, feeling a sense of pride and strength, brought weapons and enlisted themselves to do battle. There were also mothers and sisters who came with prepared food to offer the defiant soldiers. As days wore on, everyone had become fatigued, tense and weary waiting for the inevitable. Also waiting for and observing those conditions, the Houston Police Dept. and other collaborating intelligence agencies made a decision to recapture the area by using a well planned, pre-calculated military maneuver to assassinate Carl.
On day ten, Sunday July 26, several intelligence officers armed with high-powered telescopic rifles secretly gained access to the roof of St. Johns Baptist Church. It was the tallest building in the same block as the Headquarters and would provide the tactical advantage to hold off any return fire and to execute the assassination. As nightfall approached, Carl was speaking to a crowd of about 100 people at a spontaneous rally in front of the office. The rally was called to raise bail money for two brothers who were arrested earlier. A car speeding by with two women in it shouted out that white men were shooting from the roof of the church. Carl quickly dismissed the crowd out of concern for their safety. He asked Roy Bartee Haile, leader of John Brown Revolutionary League (JBRL) if any of his members were on top of the church. JBRL was a white revolutionary organization that was a part of the "Rainbow Coalition"[2] that Carl successfully organized. Shortly after hearing about the standoff, armed members of JBRL also came out to show support.
Upon finding out that it was not JBRL people, Carl valiantly picked up his M-1 carbine rifle and proceeded to investigate. Several people accompanied him. As he attempted to cross the street to get a better look, Howard Dupree, a white news reporter for Radio Station "KULF" who was also on the church roof, pointed him out to the snipers. Dupree was granted an interview by Carl a day or two earlier, thereby making him an accomplice in the assassination because of his ability to positively identify him. The conspirators, using night vision scopes, shot Carl several times in the stomach and chest with illegal hollow point dum-dum bullets. As Carl's body lie helplessly bleeding in the middle of the street, a very courageous sister darted through the rain of bullets to retrieve him. She dragged Carl to her car and rushed him to Ben Taub General Hospital in a futile attempt to save his life. It was there in the emergency room that he died. Several hundred riot-gear equipped police sealed off a 10 square block radius and swept through the area. Throughout the night and into the dawn, over sixty people were arrested and detained for questioning.
Out of this tragic situation was formed a "Black Coalition." It consisted of mainstream Black organizations responding to the reign of terror inflicted on black people by the Houston Police Dept. The coalition urged a boycott of businesses downtown. The boycott failed due to the impotent and unsustained efforts of its organizers. By making the Supreme Sacrifice and Surrendering his life to the Revolution, Carl became a martyr for our inevitable liberation. Long Live the Revolutionary Spirit of Carl Hampton!!!
On July 26, 1970, Carl Bernard Hampton, one of Black America's most articulate, courageous and heroic, young leaders was ruthlessly slain by the Houston Police Department's Central Intelligence Division (CID). At the age of 21, Carl was a tireless organizer who worked day and night to establish People's Party II[1], a Black revolutionary group modeled after the Black Panther Party (BPP). Armed with determination to see his people free from the oppression, exploitation and degradation by a racist and corrupt system bent on the destruction of Blacks and people of color, he proceeded boldly with his mission. Consistently, he rallied people around the issue of police brutality and murder that was quite prevalent at that time. Speaking with much power and authority, he was able to capture the hearts and minds of the people and therefore, their respect and admiration. Seeing the effects his words and actions were having on the community, it would be only a matter of time before the government would move in to "neutralize" him.
The 2800 block of Dowling Street was known for its illicit activities of alcohol, drugs, prostitution and killings. Undaunted by threats on his life, Carl continued to organize within the infamous section of Houston's Black community, the Third Ward. Intensely sensitive to the poverty in the area and seeing people suffer as a result, Carl's immediate concern was to provide decent clothing and food to the many needy people who resided there. It was during his effort to obtain supplies for these programs that destiny would soon usher in events that would seal his fate. It all began on a hot and humid summer afternoon, July 17, 1970. Carl would be returning from a trip home back to the Headquarters of People's Party II (PPII). Upon arriving and stepping out of the car, he noticed two uniform patrolmen harassing a young brother who had been selling the "Black Panther Newspaper" on the street curb in front of the Headquarters. He approached the officer and inquired about the nature of the problem. Carl was wearing an unconcealed .45 automatic pistol strapped across his chest in a shoulder holster (legal at that time). The police officer, startled at seeing a young Black man openly wearing a pistol, immediately withdrew his attention from the initial cause of being there. He then confronted Carl and questioned him as to why he was wearing a gun. Carl responded by telling him he had a constitutional right to bear arms. Again shocked and infuriated by this reply, the officer began reaching for his gun. Seeing this, Carl instinctively drew his gun from his holster, beating the police to the draw. At that same moment, two members in the community center emerged with weapons to join in the confrontation. The driver of the patrol car quickly radioed for back up.
Realizing that it was a standoff and it would only be a matter of minutes before the area would be sealed off and police reinforcements arrive, Carl and the other members cautiously backed into the office to barricade themselves. Feeling somewhat fortified at the back of the office and looking out the windows, they could see increasing police presence, dressed in riot gear darting to and fro to position themselves behind cars and buildings. With tensions escalating, a commanding officer of the Houston Police Dept. entered the office doors in an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate for them to surrender. Rather than be taken to jail, Carl felt his chances would be better out on the street, having his lawyer negotiate terms for surrender. His reluctance to be arrested was due to the numerous cases of police brutality and murder of Blacks in the jails and on the street during that time. The negotiating officer quickly exited the doors after seeing no sign of compromise.
Meanwhile, a large crowd of people out on the streets who witnessed the incident began to congregate in front of the office. So enraged were they at the hostile police presence that they offered themselves as a shield between the PPII members and the trigger-happy police. In fact, the crowd was so confident and protective that they dared police to fire on PPII Headquarters. This being an unexpected situation and the police not knowing how to properly deal with it, decided to retreat from the area and develop a contingency plan. Thus followed a sense of victory in the peoples' ability to back down the Police Dept. By this time, most of Houston became aware of the standoff between PPII and the Houston Police Dept. because of news flashes. People from all over the city's Black communities poured into the 2800 block of Dowling Street to offer support. Many brothers, feeling a sense of pride and strength, brought weapons and enlisted themselves to do battle. There were also mothers and sisters who came with prepared food to offer the defiant soldiers. As days wore on, everyone had become fatigued, tense and weary waiting for the inevitable. Also waiting for and observing those conditions, the Houston Police Dept. and other collaborating intelligence agencies made a decision to recapture the area by using a well planned, pre-calculated military maneuver to assassinate Carl.
On day ten, Sunday July 26, several intelligence officers armed with high-powered telescopic rifles secretly gained access to the roof of St. Johns Baptist Church. It was the tallest building in the same block as the Headquarters and would provide the tactical advantage to hold off any return fire and to execute the assassination. As nightfall approached, Carl was speaking to a crowd of about 100 people at a spontaneous rally in front of the office. The rally was called to raise bail money for two brothers who were arrested earlier. A car speeding by with two women in it shouted out that white men were shooting from the roof of the church. Carl quickly dismissed the crowd out of concern for their safety. He asked Roy Bartee Haile, leader of John Brown Revolutionary League (JBRL) if any of his members were on top of the church. JBRL was a white revolutionary organization that was a part of the "Rainbow Coalition"[2] that Carl successfully organized. Shortly after hearing about the standoff, armed members of JBRL also came out to show support.
Upon finding out that it was not JBRL people, Carl valiantly picked up his M-1 carbine rifle and proceeded to investigate. Several people accompanied him. As he attempted to cross the street to get a better look, Howard Dupree, a white news reporter for Radio Station "KULF" who was also on the church roof, pointed him out to the snipers. Dupree was granted an interview by Carl a day or two earlier, thereby making him an accomplice in the assassination because of his ability to positively identify him. The conspirators, using night vision scopes, shot Carl several times in the stomach and chest with illegal hollow point dum-dum bullets. As Carl's body lie helplessly bleeding in the middle of the street, a very courageous sister darted through the rain of bullets to retrieve him. She dragged Carl to her car and rushed him to Ben Taub General Hospital in a futile attempt to save his life. It was there in the emergency room that he died. Several hundred riot-gear equipped police sealed off a 10 square block radius and swept through the area. Throughout the night and into the dawn, over sixty people were arrested and detained for questioning.
Out of this tragic situation was formed a "Black Coalition." It consisted of mainstream Black organizations responding to the reign of terror inflicted on black people by the Houston Police Dept. The coalition urged a boycott of businesses downtown. The boycott failed due to the impotent and unsustained efforts of its organizers. By making the Supreme Sacrifice and Surrendering his life to the Revolution, Carl became a martyr for our inevitable liberation. Long Live the Revolutionary Spirit of Carl Hampton!!!
Monday, April 8, 2013
Capture-Trial imprisonment- (Virginia) - Safiyah Bukhari
Capture On January 25, 1975, some other members of the Amistad Collective of the BLA and I went into the country in Virginia to practice night firing. We were to leave Virginia that night on our way to Jackson, Mississippi, because I wanted to be there on Sunday to see someone. Before returning to the crib where we were staying, we decided to stop at a store to pick up cold cuts for sandwiches to avoid stopping at roadside restaurants on the way down. We drove around looking for an open store. When we came to one, I told the Brothers to wait in the car and I would go in and be right back. I entered the store, went past the registers, down an aisle to the meat counter and started checking them for all-beef products. I heard the door open, saw two of the Brothers coming in, and did not give it a thought. I went back to what I was doing, but out of the corner of my left eye, I saw the manager's hand with a rifle pointed toward the door. I quickly got into an aisle just as the firing started. Up to this point, no words had been spoken. With the first lull in shooting, Kombozi [Armistad] (one of my bodyguards and a member of the Amistad Collective) came down the aisle toward me. He was wearing a full-length army coat. It as completely buttoned. As he approached, he told me he had been shot. I did not believe him at first, because I saw no blood and his weapon was not drawn. He insisted, so I told him to lie down on the floor and I would take care of it. Masai [Ehehosi] (my co-defendant) apparently had made it out the door when the firing started because he reappeared at the door, trying to draw the fire so we could get out. I saw him get shot in the face and stumble backwards out the door. I looked for a way out and realized there was none. I elected to play it low-key to try to get help for Kombozi as soon as possible. That effort was wasted. The manager of the store and his son, Paul Green Sr. and Jr., stomped Kombozi to death in front of my eyes. Later, when I attempted to press counter-charges of murder against them, the Commonwealth attorney called it "justifiable" homicide. Five minutes after the shootout, the FBI was on the scene. The next morning, they held a press conference in which they said I was notorious, dangerous, etc., and known to law enforcement agencies nationwide. My bail was set at one million dollars for each of the five counts against me.
Trial and Imprisonment On April 16, 1975, after a trial that lasted one day, we were sentenced to 40 years; that night, I arrived here at the Virginia Correctional Center for Women in Goochland. Directly following my arrival, i was placed in the maximum-security building. There I stayed until the threat of court action led them to release me into the general population. The day after my release to general population, I was told that the first iota of trouble I caused would land me back in the maximum-security building and there I would stay. My emphasis then and for the next two years was on getting medical care for myself and the other women, as well as educational programs and activities, with the priority being on medical care for myself. Inside the prison, I was denied care. The general feeling was they could not chance hospitalization for fear I would escape; as such, they preferred to take a chance on my life. The courts said they saw no evidence of inadequate medical care, but rather a difference of opinion on treatment between the prison doctor and me.
The quality of "medical treatment" for women prisoners in Virginia must be at an all-time low. Their lives are in the hands of a "doctor" who examines a woman whose right ovary has been removed and tells her there is tenderness in the missing ovary. This "doctor" examines a woman who has been in prison for six months and tells her that she is six weeks pregnant and there is nothing wrong with her. She later finds her baby has died and mortified inside of her. Alternatively, he tells you that you are not pregnant and three months later, you give birth to a seven-pound baby boy. The list includes prescribing Maalox for a sore throat and diagnosing a sore throat that turns out to be cancer. In December 1976, I started hemorrhaging and went to the clinic for help. No help of any consequence was given, so I escaped. Two months later, I was recaptured. While on escape a doctor told me that I could endure the situation, take painkillers, or have surgery. I decided to use the lack of medical care as my defense for the escape to accomplish two things: (1) expose the level of medical care at the prison, and (2) put pressure on them to give me the care I needed.
I finally got to the hospital in June 1978. By then, it was too late. I was so messed up inside that everything but one ovary had to go. Because of the negligence of the "doctor" and the lack of feeling on the part of the prison officials, I was forced to have a hysterectomy. When they brought me back to this prison in March 1977, because of the escape, they placed me in Cell 5 on the segregation end of the maximum-security building--the same room they placed me in on April 16, 1975. I remain in that cell, allegedly because of my escape, but in actuality because of my politics.. RIP WITH THE ANCESTORZ YOUR SACRIFICE IS APPRECIATED REST WITH THE ANCESTORZ NANA SAFIYAH BUHKARI .. NEW AFRIKAN WARRIORESS ASE' from THE WAR BEYOND (Coming of age: a Black revolutionary) RB!!! FTL!! @Haki_shakur
Trial and Imprisonment On April 16, 1975, after a trial that lasted one day, we were sentenced to 40 years; that night, I arrived here at the Virginia Correctional Center for Women in Goochland. Directly following my arrival, i was placed in the maximum-security building. There I stayed until the threat of court action led them to release me into the general population. The day after my release to general population, I was told that the first iota of trouble I caused would land me back in the maximum-security building and there I would stay. My emphasis then and for the next two years was on getting medical care for myself and the other women, as well as educational programs and activities, with the priority being on medical care for myself. Inside the prison, I was denied care. The general feeling was they could not chance hospitalization for fear I would escape; as such, they preferred to take a chance on my life. The courts said they saw no evidence of inadequate medical care, but rather a difference of opinion on treatment between the prison doctor and me.
The quality of "medical treatment" for women prisoners in Virginia must be at an all-time low. Their lives are in the hands of a "doctor" who examines a woman whose right ovary has been removed and tells her there is tenderness in the missing ovary. This "doctor" examines a woman who has been in prison for six months and tells her that she is six weeks pregnant and there is nothing wrong with her. She later finds her baby has died and mortified inside of her. Alternatively, he tells you that you are not pregnant and three months later, you give birth to a seven-pound baby boy. The list includes prescribing Maalox for a sore throat and diagnosing a sore throat that turns out to be cancer. In December 1976, I started hemorrhaging and went to the clinic for help. No help of any consequence was given, so I escaped. Two months later, I was recaptured. While on escape a doctor told me that I could endure the situation, take painkillers, or have surgery. I decided to use the lack of medical care as my defense for the escape to accomplish two things: (1) expose the level of medical care at the prison, and (2) put pressure on them to give me the care I needed.
I finally got to the hospital in June 1978. By then, it was too late. I was so messed up inside that everything but one ovary had to go. Because of the negligence of the "doctor" and the lack of feeling on the part of the prison officials, I was forced to have a hysterectomy. When they brought me back to this prison in March 1977, because of the escape, they placed me in Cell 5 on the segregation end of the maximum-security building--the same room they placed me in on April 16, 1975. I remain in that cell, allegedly because of my escape, but in actuality because of my politics.. RIP WITH THE ANCESTORZ YOUR SACRIFICE IS APPRECIATED REST WITH THE ANCESTORZ NANA SAFIYAH BUHKARI .. NEW AFRIKAN WARRIORESS ASE' from THE WAR BEYOND (Coming of age: a Black revolutionary) RB!!! FTL!! @Haki_shakur
Sunday, April 7, 2013
PRISONERS OF WAR: A NEW AFRIKAN PERSPECTIVE -Atiba Shanna (Owusu Yaki Yakubu)
ON CAPTURED CITIZENS, POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND PRISONERS OF WAR: A NEW AFRIKAN PERSPECTIVE Atiba Shanna The New Afrikan Independence Movement (NAIM) continues to have a need for a clear, commonly-held stand (i.e., shared consciousness; further development, dissemination, and grasp of the idealogical, theoretical, and political bases of our line) on New Afrikan citizens held in U.S. prisons and jails. This stand is particularly necessary, in some respects, relative to our captured nationals, i.e. conscious New Afrikan citizens who are held as political prisoners and prisoners of war.1 We need this stand not only so that it can serve as a guide to enhance our work around prisons and prisoners. The consciousness which inspires our work with and for New Afrikan prisoners is the same consciousness which guides all other work, with and for all New Afrikan people, around all other issues and institutions that affect our lives.
The components of our stand are: 1) the relationship between New Afrikan people on the one hand, and the U.S. and its prisons on the other: 2) the levels of consciousness which distinguish conscious citizens from unconscious citizens; 3) the character of the activity which distinguishes captured unconscious citizens from political prisoners and prisoners of war. The relationship between New Afrikan people and the U.S. settler-imperialist state, is one between oppressed and oppressor nations. This fundamental distinction was emphasized when We issued, in effect, a declaration of war (the New Afrikan DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, wherein We proclaimed ourselves "free and independent of the jurisdiction of the United States of America and the obligations which that country's unilateral decision to make our ancestors and ourselves paper-citizens placed on us". We then went on to list the basic objectives of the New Afrikan national liberation revolution.
The New Afrikan Independence Movement is not a "prison movement"— it is a movement in the process of becoming a State. This process required the assumption of even greater responsibility for the welfare of all New Afrikan people, as We seek to become recognized for the welfare of all New Afrikan people, as We seek to become recognized by them as their legitimate representatives (i.e., as their government, and vis-avis the U.S. and the world community). The movement should, therefore, begin to manifest greater cooperation, centralization, and coordination, and it should become more adept at the proportional allocation and expenditure of resources, based on the strategic and/or tactical priority given the various fronts and projects undertaken within them.) Because New Afrikans are engaged in a struggle for national independence and socialism, our aim, relative to the U.S. prison system, is not to reform it, We plan to secure the release of all New Afrikan citizens from U.S. prisons — but We will do so only as a consequence of national liberation revolution. In the short term, We'll continue to be concerned with such things as securing the release of certain prisoners, and with struggling to improve treatment and the living conditions of captured citizens and nationals. However, the success of these efforts will greatly depend upon our success in educating, organizing and mobilizing our people on all The term "national" is used throughout this article to distinguish unconscious citizens from conscious ones, i.e. those who owe an allegience to the defined objectives of New Afrikan people, and to the organs representing us in our struggle for national self-determination. other fronts. This will, in turn, be dependent upon the movement's ability to effectively engage in struggle in all spheres of the lives of New Afrikan people.
Our stand on New Afrikan citizens held in U.S. prisons and jails also rests on our consideration of the different levels of consciousness among them, and upon recognition of the different kinds of activity that they are and/or were engaged in. The distinction between "conscious" and "unconscious" New Afrikan citizens was made — and the importance of the distinction was emphasized — in the first Article of the CODE OF UMOJA, our nation's Constitution: Article I New Afrikan Citizenship Section 1 — Citizenship By Birth Each Afrikan person born in America is a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika. Section 2 — Citizenship By Parentage Any child born to a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika is a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika. Section 3 — Citizenship By Naturalization Any person not otherwise a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika may become a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika by completing the proceduresfor naturalization as proved by the People's Center Council. Section 4 — Pre-Ratification Citizenship Retained Each person who is a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika at the time of the passage of this CODE OF UMOJA is hereafter a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika. Section 5 — Right To Choice of Citizenship Notwithstanding Sections 1,2,3, and 4 of Article 1, the right of any person to expressly deny or renounce his/her citizenship shall not be denied. Section 6 — Citizenship of Other Afrikans Persons of Afrikan descent, wherever their original place of birth or domicile in the world, have a right to New Afrikan citizenship, as provided by the People's Center Council. Section 7 — Conscious Citizenship All citizens of the Republic of New Afrika who are aware of their citizenship are conscious New Afrikan citizens. As a result of an over 300 year old policy offeree and fraud used by the United States go government and thegovernment of various American states against the New Afrikan nation, many citizens of the Republic of New Afrika are not aware of their human rights to New Afrikan Citizenship and indeed are not aware of the existence of the New Afrikan nation in North America. The growth of conscious New Afrikan citizenship is related to the success of the liberation struggle.
The objective measurement of that growth shall be a consideration in the development and implementation of Provisional Government policy, programs and structure as determined by the People's Center Council. (Emphasis added — A.S.)^ One cannot fight for national self-determination if one is unaware of the very existence of the nation. Unconscious citizens owe no permanent allegiance to the defined objectives of New Afrikan people, and they owe no permanent allegiance to any organ represent the people, e.g., the Provisional Government. Acts performed by unconscious citizens can rarely, if ever, be accorded the status of acts performed by New Afrikan political prisoners and prisoners of war: What We got to see more clearly is that exile all colonial subjects are "the same" vis-avis the oppressor, one of the requirements for genuine and successful national liberation revolution is the making of an analysis of the colony's social structure {i.e., class analysis}. The conditions that all Afrikans in {the U.S.} experience are essentially and objectively colonial. But this doesn't mean that all Afrikan people have the same revolutionary capacity of inclination. When We define all Afrikan prisoners as political prisoners and/or as prisoners of war, We aren't defining "political prisoners"-We're simply defining Afrikan prisoners as colonial subjects—captured colonial subjects3 Captured (unconscious) citizens "are the mass, general prison populations which Afrikans comprise. The simple status of a 20th century slave gives political character and significance to us all — but doesn't determine whether that political character and significance will be good or bad for the nation and the struggle.
"The New Afrikan nation...was formed because of and during the battles with Europeans in which We lost our independence. During our enslavement the many nations...from the continent {of Afrika} shared one history, developed essentially one consciousness, acquired objectively one destiny — all as a result of the suffering We all experienced as a dominated people. " "... But so far as the struggle is concerned it must be realized that it is not the degree of suffering and hardship involved as such that matters: even extreme suffering in itself does not necessarily produce the prise de conscience required for the national liberation struggle.' (Amilcar Cabral, Revolution In Guinea, p. 63.) 2Code of Umoia (Code of Unity) of the Republic of New Afrika, Published by the Justice Minister of the Provisional Government, R.N.A., July, 1984 3Notes From A New Afrikan P.O.W. Journal Book Two, p. 25. "While the 'criminal' acts of all Afrikans are the results of our general economic, political and social relationships to the oppressive, imperialist state, there is no automatic unquestionable revolutionary nationalist capacity and consciousness. "If We say the 'crime' is a reflection of the present state of property relation,' then We must also say that for us these relations are those between a dominated nation and its oppressor and exploiter. The method of economic organization which governs our lives is an imperialist, a colonialist method. Although this colonial system is structured so as to force many of us to take what We need {from the oppressor} in order to survive, and although there are conscious political decisions made by the oppressor once We find ourselves in the grips of his 'criminal justice system', it must also be seen that a conscious political decision must also be made on the part of the colonial subject before his {or her} acts can have a subjective, functional political meaning within the context of the national liberation struggle. "Put another way: If the 'criminal' acts of Afrikans are the results of a 'grossly disproportionate distribution of wealth and privilege,' which stems from our status as a dominated, colonized nation, then the only way to prevent crime among us is to make a conscious decision to liberate the nation and establish among ourselves a more equitable distribution of wealth and privilege."4 The movement's major responsibility toward imprisoned unconscious citizens is, at this time, to promote New Afrikan consciousness, and to involve them in structured activity which will promote the further development of the movement, and of the national liberation struggle.
New Afrikans held by the U.S. as political prisoners, and those held as prisoners of war, are conscious citizens of the nation. What distinguishes political prisoners from prisoners of war is the the latter (POW's) are classified as armed forces of the nation. However, political prisoners and prisoners of war owe a permanent allegiance to the defined objectives of the New Afrikan Independence Movement, and an allegiance to an organized formation which represents New Afrikan people and fights in their interest. The Provisional Government of the nation is one such organ. In the Preamble to the CODE OF UMOJA, The Provisional Government specifically recognized "the importance and necessity of the campaigns of all the nation's armed freedom fighting forces fighting in accordance with international low, including the Geneva Convention..." As We pursue our campaign for international recognition of the legitimacy of our struggle for national self-determination, and thus for the recognition of POW status for our captured nationals, We, too, must abide by international humanitarian laws. 5 Of primary concern to us is the law as codified in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 4Ibid., p. 26 5 A distinction is usually made between "international Law" which applies to the relations between nations and "international humanitarian law," which regulates the conduct of warfare.
Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, known as the Third Convention, and 6 and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, known as Protocol I.)7 The Third Convention, written shortly after what's commonly referred to as "World War II," was not originally designed or intended to apply to wars of national liberation and against colonialism, and in which guerrilla or irregular units operated or were the primary from of the liberation movement's armed forces: Article 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 8 Article 2 is significant not only for its reference to the applicability of the Convention "even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them." In fact, Article 2 makes it clear that the Convention can be applied by a "party" that was not one of the original "High Contracting Parties."
To begin with, in our situation, it is New Afrikan people that is the "party" in our conflict with the U.S. bodies, such as the Provisional Government, constitute an organ representing the people. It remains, therefore, for the Provisional Government to issue our "declaration of acceptance," as required by Article 2 of the Third Convention, and by Article 96 of Protocol I: 2. When one of the parties to the conflict is not bound by this Protocol, the Parties to the Protocol shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by this Protocol in relation to Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 7Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relation to the Protection of Victims of International Armed conflicts approved for signature Dec. 12, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, U.N. Doc. No. A/32/144 (1977, 72 American Journal of International Law 457 (1978), 16 International Legal Materials 1391 (1977) 8 Third Geneva Convention, Article each of the Parties which are not bound by it, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 3. The authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may undertake to apply the Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by means of a unilateral declaration addressed to the depository.
Such declaration shall upon receipt by the depository, have in relation to that conflict the following effects" (a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the said authority of a Party to the conflict with immediate effect; (b) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this Protocol; and (c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all Parties to the conflict.9 Although the definition of prisoners of war in the Third Convention were rather restrictive, relative to guerrilla warfare and national liberation struggles, it would be in our interests to study it" Article 4. A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy" (1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces (2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, proved that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movement, fulfill the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance1 (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. (3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. (4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, member of labor unit or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed mode (5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.
(6)Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war. **************************************** B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention: ...(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and when these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favorable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exceptions of Articles 8, 10, 15,30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. When such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties. 10 The Third Convention continues to apply-in a less restrictive manner—to national liberation struggles, because it has been supplemented with Protocol I. Protocol I extended and broadens the rules regulating the conduct of international armed conflicts to cover changes which have taken place in the relations between nations and in the conduct of warfare. The imperialist powers are on the defensive; new nations have emerged, and others are struggling to liberate themselves. In view of such changes, Protocol I defines a new category of war -- wars for national liberation" Article I... 3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions. 4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph includes armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of United Nations. n Whereas the Third Convention made the status of guerrilla combatants largely dependent upon criteria difficult for liberation movement to meet, Protocol 1 defines combatants and POW's in a more realistic manner:
Article 43 — Armed forces 1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even it that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. *********************************** Article 44 — Combatants and prisoners of war 1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war. 12. The major task now before us is not that of haggling over the definition of a prisoner of war. At bottom, our words about POW's weigh far less than our practice on their behalf. Seeking recognition of the legitimacy of our claims regarding the nation's right to national self-determination, and/or regarding the status of our captured nationals as political prisoners and prisoners of war, is done in two ways. We must continue to pursue and exhaust all "legal" avenues (i.e., in U.S. courts, through international bodies, etc.). However, these approaches will mean little or nothing unless there is further development of the New Afrikan Independence Movement and our national liberation struggle, so that the objective existence of a people's war will allow our practice to be the ultimate criteria of the truth of our claims. Re-Build! Free The Land! AtibaShanna (Owusu Yaki Yakubu)
The components of our stand are: 1) the relationship between New Afrikan people on the one hand, and the U.S. and its prisons on the other: 2) the levels of consciousness which distinguish conscious citizens from unconscious citizens; 3) the character of the activity which distinguishes captured unconscious citizens from political prisoners and prisoners of war. The relationship between New Afrikan people and the U.S. settler-imperialist state, is one between oppressed and oppressor nations. This fundamental distinction was emphasized when We issued, in effect, a declaration of war (the New Afrikan DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, wherein We proclaimed ourselves "free and independent of the jurisdiction of the United States of America and the obligations which that country's unilateral decision to make our ancestors and ourselves paper-citizens placed on us". We then went on to list the basic objectives of the New Afrikan national liberation revolution.
The New Afrikan Independence Movement is not a "prison movement"— it is a movement in the process of becoming a State. This process required the assumption of even greater responsibility for the welfare of all New Afrikan people, as We seek to become recognized for the welfare of all New Afrikan people, as We seek to become recognized by them as their legitimate representatives (i.e., as their government, and vis-avis the U.S. and the world community). The movement should, therefore, begin to manifest greater cooperation, centralization, and coordination, and it should become more adept at the proportional allocation and expenditure of resources, based on the strategic and/or tactical priority given the various fronts and projects undertaken within them.) Because New Afrikans are engaged in a struggle for national independence and socialism, our aim, relative to the U.S. prison system, is not to reform it, We plan to secure the release of all New Afrikan citizens from U.S. prisons — but We will do so only as a consequence of national liberation revolution. In the short term, We'll continue to be concerned with such things as securing the release of certain prisoners, and with struggling to improve treatment and the living conditions of captured citizens and nationals. However, the success of these efforts will greatly depend upon our success in educating, organizing and mobilizing our people on all The term "national" is used throughout this article to distinguish unconscious citizens from conscious ones, i.e. those who owe an allegience to the defined objectives of New Afrikan people, and to the organs representing us in our struggle for national self-determination. other fronts. This will, in turn, be dependent upon the movement's ability to effectively engage in struggle in all spheres of the lives of New Afrikan people.
Our stand on New Afrikan citizens held in U.S. prisons and jails also rests on our consideration of the different levels of consciousness among them, and upon recognition of the different kinds of activity that they are and/or were engaged in. The distinction between "conscious" and "unconscious" New Afrikan citizens was made — and the importance of the distinction was emphasized — in the first Article of the CODE OF UMOJA, our nation's Constitution: Article I New Afrikan Citizenship Section 1 — Citizenship By Birth Each Afrikan person born in America is a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika. Section 2 — Citizenship By Parentage Any child born to a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika is a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika. Section 3 — Citizenship By Naturalization Any person not otherwise a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika may become a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika by completing the proceduresfor naturalization as proved by the People's Center Council. Section 4 — Pre-Ratification Citizenship Retained Each person who is a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika at the time of the passage of this CODE OF UMOJA is hereafter a citizen of the Republic of New Afrika. Section 5 — Right To Choice of Citizenship Notwithstanding Sections 1,2,3, and 4 of Article 1, the right of any person to expressly deny or renounce his/her citizenship shall not be denied. Section 6 — Citizenship of Other Afrikans Persons of Afrikan descent, wherever their original place of birth or domicile in the world, have a right to New Afrikan citizenship, as provided by the People's Center Council. Section 7 — Conscious Citizenship All citizens of the Republic of New Afrika who are aware of their citizenship are conscious New Afrikan citizens. As a result of an over 300 year old policy offeree and fraud used by the United States go government and thegovernment of various American states against the New Afrikan nation, many citizens of the Republic of New Afrika are not aware of their human rights to New Afrikan Citizenship and indeed are not aware of the existence of the New Afrikan nation in North America. The growth of conscious New Afrikan citizenship is related to the success of the liberation struggle.
The objective measurement of that growth shall be a consideration in the development and implementation of Provisional Government policy, programs and structure as determined by the People's Center Council. (Emphasis added — A.S.)^ One cannot fight for national self-determination if one is unaware of the very existence of the nation. Unconscious citizens owe no permanent allegiance to the defined objectives of New Afrikan people, and they owe no permanent allegiance to any organ represent the people, e.g., the Provisional Government. Acts performed by unconscious citizens can rarely, if ever, be accorded the status of acts performed by New Afrikan political prisoners and prisoners of war: What We got to see more clearly is that exile all colonial subjects are "the same" vis-avis the oppressor, one of the requirements for genuine and successful national liberation revolution is the making of an analysis of the colony's social structure {i.e., class analysis}. The conditions that all Afrikans in {the U.S.} experience are essentially and objectively colonial. But this doesn't mean that all Afrikan people have the same revolutionary capacity of inclination. When We define all Afrikan prisoners as political prisoners and/or as prisoners of war, We aren't defining "political prisoners"-We're simply defining Afrikan prisoners as colonial subjects—captured colonial subjects3 Captured (unconscious) citizens "are the mass, general prison populations which Afrikans comprise. The simple status of a 20th century slave gives political character and significance to us all — but doesn't determine whether that political character and significance will be good or bad for the nation and the struggle.
"The New Afrikan nation...was formed because of and during the battles with Europeans in which We lost our independence. During our enslavement the many nations...from the continent {of Afrika} shared one history, developed essentially one consciousness, acquired objectively one destiny — all as a result of the suffering We all experienced as a dominated people. " "... But so far as the struggle is concerned it must be realized that it is not the degree of suffering and hardship involved as such that matters: even extreme suffering in itself does not necessarily produce the prise de conscience required for the national liberation struggle.' (Amilcar Cabral, Revolution In Guinea, p. 63.) 2Code of Umoia (Code of Unity) of the Republic of New Afrika, Published by the Justice Minister of the Provisional Government, R.N.A., July, 1984 3Notes From A New Afrikan P.O.W. Journal Book Two, p. 25. "While the 'criminal' acts of all Afrikans are the results of our general economic, political and social relationships to the oppressive, imperialist state, there is no automatic unquestionable revolutionary nationalist capacity and consciousness. "If We say the 'crime' is a reflection of the present state of property relation,' then We must also say that for us these relations are those between a dominated nation and its oppressor and exploiter. The method of economic organization which governs our lives is an imperialist, a colonialist method. Although this colonial system is structured so as to force many of us to take what We need {from the oppressor} in order to survive, and although there are conscious political decisions made by the oppressor once We find ourselves in the grips of his 'criminal justice system', it must also be seen that a conscious political decision must also be made on the part of the colonial subject before his {or her} acts can have a subjective, functional political meaning within the context of the national liberation struggle. "Put another way: If the 'criminal' acts of Afrikans are the results of a 'grossly disproportionate distribution of wealth and privilege,' which stems from our status as a dominated, colonized nation, then the only way to prevent crime among us is to make a conscious decision to liberate the nation and establish among ourselves a more equitable distribution of wealth and privilege."4 The movement's major responsibility toward imprisoned unconscious citizens is, at this time, to promote New Afrikan consciousness, and to involve them in structured activity which will promote the further development of the movement, and of the national liberation struggle.
New Afrikans held by the U.S. as political prisoners, and those held as prisoners of war, are conscious citizens of the nation. What distinguishes political prisoners from prisoners of war is the the latter (POW's) are classified as armed forces of the nation. However, political prisoners and prisoners of war owe a permanent allegiance to the defined objectives of the New Afrikan Independence Movement, and an allegiance to an organized formation which represents New Afrikan people and fights in their interest. The Provisional Government of the nation is one such organ. In the Preamble to the CODE OF UMOJA, The Provisional Government specifically recognized "the importance and necessity of the campaigns of all the nation's armed freedom fighting forces fighting in accordance with international low, including the Geneva Convention..." As We pursue our campaign for international recognition of the legitimacy of our struggle for national self-determination, and thus for the recognition of POW status for our captured nationals, We, too, must abide by international humanitarian laws. 5 Of primary concern to us is the law as codified in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 4Ibid., p. 26 5 A distinction is usually made between "international Law" which applies to the relations between nations and "international humanitarian law," which regulates the conduct of warfare.
Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, known as the Third Convention, and 6 and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, known as Protocol I.)7 The Third Convention, written shortly after what's commonly referred to as "World War II," was not originally designed or intended to apply to wars of national liberation and against colonialism, and in which guerrilla or irregular units operated or were the primary from of the liberation movement's armed forces: Article 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 8 Article 2 is significant not only for its reference to the applicability of the Convention "even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them." In fact, Article 2 makes it clear that the Convention can be applied by a "party" that was not one of the original "High Contracting Parties."
To begin with, in our situation, it is New Afrikan people that is the "party" in our conflict with the U.S. bodies, such as the Provisional Government, constitute an organ representing the people. It remains, therefore, for the Provisional Government to issue our "declaration of acceptance," as required by Article 2 of the Third Convention, and by Article 96 of Protocol I: 2. When one of the parties to the conflict is not bound by this Protocol, the Parties to the Protocol shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by this Protocol in relation to Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 7Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relation to the Protection of Victims of International Armed conflicts approved for signature Dec. 12, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, U.N. Doc. No. A/32/144 (1977, 72 American Journal of International Law 457 (1978), 16 International Legal Materials 1391 (1977) 8 Third Geneva Convention, Article each of the Parties which are not bound by it, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 3. The authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may undertake to apply the Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by means of a unilateral declaration addressed to the depository.
Such declaration shall upon receipt by the depository, have in relation to that conflict the following effects" (a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the said authority of a Party to the conflict with immediate effect; (b) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this Protocol; and (c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all Parties to the conflict.9 Although the definition of prisoners of war in the Third Convention were rather restrictive, relative to guerrilla warfare and national liberation struggles, it would be in our interests to study it" Article 4. A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy" (1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces (2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, proved that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movement, fulfill the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance1 (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. (3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. (4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, member of labor unit or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed mode (5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.
(6)Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war. **************************************** B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention: ...(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and when these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favorable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exceptions of Articles 8, 10, 15,30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. When such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties. 10 The Third Convention continues to apply-in a less restrictive manner—to national liberation struggles, because it has been supplemented with Protocol I. Protocol I extended and broadens the rules regulating the conduct of international armed conflicts to cover changes which have taken place in the relations between nations and in the conduct of warfare. The imperialist powers are on the defensive; new nations have emerged, and others are struggling to liberate themselves. In view of such changes, Protocol I defines a new category of war -- wars for national liberation" Article I... 3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions. 4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph includes armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of United Nations. n Whereas the Third Convention made the status of guerrilla combatants largely dependent upon criteria difficult for liberation movement to meet, Protocol 1 defines combatants and POW's in a more realistic manner:
Article 43 — Armed forces 1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even it that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. *********************************** Article 44 — Combatants and prisoners of war 1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war. 12. The major task now before us is not that of haggling over the definition of a prisoner of war. At bottom, our words about POW's weigh far less than our practice on their behalf. Seeking recognition of the legitimacy of our claims regarding the nation's right to national self-determination, and/or regarding the status of our captured nationals as political prisoners and prisoners of war, is done in two ways. We must continue to pursue and exhaust all "legal" avenues (i.e., in U.S. courts, through international bodies, etc.). However, these approaches will mean little or nothing unless there is further development of the New Afrikan Independence Movement and our national liberation struggle, so that the objective existence of a people's war will allow our practice to be the ultimate criteria of the truth of our claims. Re-Build! Free The Land! AtibaShanna (Owusu Yaki Yakubu)
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