Thursday, October 17, 2013

ASSATA SHAKUR, EXCLUDING THE NIGHTMARE AFTER THE DREAM

The “Terrorist” Label And The Criminalization of Revolutionary Black Movements in The USA
By Dhoruba Bin-Wahad
Americans live at a time when the history of those who have been cheated, murdered or excluded is being destroyed. Eliminated from this history are the collective narratives of struggle, resistance and rebellion against various forms of authoritarianism.  Henry Giroux [The Ghost of Authoritarianism in the Age of the Shutdown]


At a press conference in May 2013, the Federal Bureau of Investigation  [FBI] announced that it was designating Assata Shakur, s/n Joanne Chesimard, as one of its top ten wanted “terrorists.”  Assata escaped from a New Jersey jail in 1979 and thereafter surfaced in Cuba where she was granted political asylum.   This designation, and the media hoopla surrounding it, has significant historical and political implications.  While numerous progressive individuals and organizations correctly denounced that designation recognizing that it was, in part, an attack on Cuba, far too many progressive and Civil Rights advocates have missed the greater and more pernicious historical revisionism and racist political implications behind Assata Shakur’s rebranding as a “terrorist.”   
Many people fighting for human rights, who oppose Obama’s policies of  “Rendition,” torture, (which is euphemistically termed Enhanced Interrogation Technique),  indefinite detention, State sponsored murder by RCV’s (drones) have simultaneously called upon President Barack Obama to remove the Shakur’s“terrorist”  designation, arguing that Assata is “innocent” of the murder charges that resulted from her 1973 arrest.  Unlike their opposition to Obama’s illegally conducted “war on terror” the same people who oppose the murder and detention of so called “militant” and “jihadists” without according them legal due process nonetheless implicitly recognize that those targeted by the US are in fact members of “movements” targeted by the U.S. government and would not be otherwise targeted were they not.  Yet notably missing from most public statements decrying Asatta’s designation as a “terrorist” were attempts to place Assata’s case, and the “terrorist” designation, in the political and cultural context of the Black Liberation Movement in the United States.   Instead Officials at the highest level of government have little trouble placing the movements of the sixties in context.  President Obama during his speech commemorating the March On Washington, recounted his version of the sixties claiming Black people lost their way when “legitimate grievances against police brutality tipped into excuse-making for criminal behavior.” What was Obama talking about? Who was he referring to? What Blacks used police brutality to somehow mask criminal activity? He never said but clearly Obama is referring to the Black Panther Party, but he won’t say so. But his comments when juxtaposed next to the actions of his Justice Department speak volumes. In an effort to appease domestic Law Enforcement he sanctioned his Justice Department’s targeting of a former Black Panther in exile, Assata Shakur, designating her and her movement as terrorists. Rather than open up a discussion on the excesses of the sixties and seventies to discern who were the real criminals and assassins, the architects of COINTELPRO or the movements they illegally infiltrated and destroyed, both supporters and detractors of Assata distort, exclude, and ignore the movement from which she emerged. This essay is an attempt to place the “terrorist” designation and Assata’s case, in a historical and political context, a context that also significantly impacts the status of Black Political prisoners in the United States.

The Black Liberation (nationalist), Civil Right (Integrationist) and Pan-African Movements circa 1960 - 1975
To begin, it is necessary to step into a time capsule and head back to the 1960’s.  The following history is not intended to be definitive or complete.    But this is a history that is relatively unknown, or if known, deliberately twisted and some who may have benefited from the distortion of Black 60’s activism.  That is why it is important to review the era now defined as a watershed period in American racial and political history – the tumultuous Sixties.
            The 1960’s and early 1970’s was a period of significant social upheaval.  Globally former European colonial powers (all members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization) were locked in the false dichotomy of the Cold War and the struggle to reassert their control over the resources of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The “cold war” geopolitically divided the world into two hostile camps: the Euro-Russian and Sino-Communist East (led by Moscow and Peking) versus the West led by the USA and its NATO allies. The front line of this global contest after the Korean War (1950 - 1954) and the French expulsion from its colonial position in Southeast Asia was Vietnam.  The US pursuing a policy of “containment of communism” took on the “white man’s burden” of the French in Vietnam and introduced a massive military presence into Vietnam to thwart the Vietnamese Independence movement.  By 1965 the Vietnamese people were winning a war of liberation against the most powerful military force in history. (We note the recent passing of the liberation movement’s great leader Vo Nguyen Giap.)  Movements within the United States – Black, Native American, Puerto Rican, Mexican - were waging similar struggles that, over time, took on an increasingly anti-imperialist character.  This inspired masses of white people, primarily youth, to question the very foundations of United States’ society.  The Women’s Liberation and LGBT movements also grew in this context.   Indeed, it was militant nationalist organizations such as the RNA, BPP, SNCC, who vocally opposed U.S. militarism abroad and the Vietnam war, prior to Dr. Martin Luther King’s denunciation of American involvement in Vietnam as amoral and capitalism as exploitive. These were the forces and events that, by 1966 defined the historical and geopolitical conditions that shaped the great civil and human rights movements of middle 20th century. 

Inspired by the example of the martyred El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz (Malcolm X), Robert Williams[1], and the original Black Panthers of Lowndes County Alabama[2], the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was founded in October 1966 in Oakland, California by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale.  In just a few months after its inception the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense emerged as a significant influence on “New Left” and radical politics in America and one of the most popular organizations and (romanticized) groups in the Black community. The BPP developed a ten-point political program based on the conditions of African American and poor people in the Bay Area of San Francisco California and across the nation.  However, the BPP’s emphasis on community control of institutions within the Black community, including education, health care and housing, resonated with urban Blacks everywhere  because institutional racism lay at the very basis of racial and political inequality nationally, not only in the Bay Area.  Blacks in Oakland and its adjacent communities had migrated from the South and Southwest, to serve as labor battalions during WW II.  The Naval base adjacent to Oakland and Port Of San Francisco played a primary logistical role in the US war effort against Imperial Japan during WWII the (1941-45). Black workers, arriving from the South to work as laborers for the war effort were redlined into specific residential areas.  These Black worker communities were policed by racist and brutal police officers, themselves recent migrants from the deep South, mainly from Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. It should surprise no one then that the BPP 10 Point Program and Platform addressed the existential reality of Black people as workers, as “cannon fodder” for U.S. militarism.  One point of the BPP program called for the end to the military draft of all Black men.  Another point called for a plebiscite in the Black community to determine whether Black people wished to remain part of the United States.   This point directly addressed the conditional and ambivalent nature of African American perennial second class “citizenship” that seems up for review every decade or so whenever the pressure of civil and economic  reforms place undue pressure on white skin privilege.  Challenging the conventional dichotomy of race relations in the U.S. the BPP reasoned that if Black people must struggle to reaffirm their “Civil Rights” every decade and constantly secure new legislation protecting their right to vote, then maybe “citizenship,” e.g. integration, is not synonymous with freedom or empowerment – and Nationalist self-determination (community control/decentralization of institutional controls) does in fact mean empowerment. This essentially was the reasoning for proposing a UN supervised plebiscite in the BPP ten-point platform of what we want and what we believe. Understanding that the Right of Self-determination for all peoples is part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (the USA is a non-signatory) as well as articles condemning racial repression and genocide, the BPP proclaimed its internationalist tendency from its very inception.

Nonetheless the most controversial, vilified and misrepresented point of the BPP’s 10-point program was its recognition of Black People’s inherent right to self-defense, including armed self-defense against racist attack, by civilians or the police.  In Oakland, Calif. armed BPP members engaged in the original of “cop-watch,” establishing regular armed patrols that followed the police, intervening, at a legal distance, when the police violated someone’s rights.   Fully appreciating how short lived their right to bear arms in public would last, and instinctively sensing how the power structure of white supremacy would attempt to disconnect the Rights of Black self-defense from non-violent movements for broader civil rights and assimilation – the bread and butter of “responsible Negro leaders“—the BPP embarked on a publicity campaign to emphasize the racist political character and purpose of law enforcement and the legislative process. The BPP’s instincts were verified when in 1967, in direct response to the BPP, the State of California sought to amend its gun laws to eliminate the right to carry a firearm in open view.  (Ironically, the bill was supported by gun rights advocates, the NRA and then Governor Ronald Reagan.  After all, it was about taking firearms from Black people!).  Indeed the Bill was called the “Black Panther” Bill.  Racially motivated Reform from the Right threatened to eat its own!  On May 2, 1967, the BPP responded by sending an armed delegation to Legislative Office Building in Sacramento debating the new gun law.[3]  The image of armed young Black women and men marching in formation on a State Capitol circulated like wild-fire around the world.   Dozens of Black community activists, mainly from the Black and Brown Ghettoes, and off the Streets across America were galvanized by the BPP’s response to the perceived denial of Black Peoples right to openly carry arms. Those who were the daily victims of police harassment, violence, and intimidation were attracted to the BPP.   These were not just “criminal minded” or sociopaths as the media and later Blaxploitaion movies would portray, but in most cases serious activists and organizers in their respective communities. It is not generally understood that the membership and leadership of BPP in cities across the US was comprised of local activists who were active in their community before 1967.  The organizational character of the BPP was also shaped by its ideological and organizational structure.  A creation of its era, the BPP  was not a “faith-based” messianic movement , or mass-based organization like Garvey’s UNIA, but a Cadre based Revolutionary formation that introduced a disparate membership  to principles of revolutionary Nationalism, and Internationalism. These characteristics permitted the BPP to become the first Black organization to establish functional relations with liberation movements in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.  It is the legacy of those fraternal relationships that serves to protect Assata Shakur in Cuba today.  This is one of the reasons why the FBI publicity stunt classifying Assata as a terrorist blatantly attempts to rewrite this history and denigrate legitimate movements.
            When BPP Chapters sprang up throughout the country, the FBI, State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies realized that unless the ideas of Black self-defense were completely discredited, demonized, and rejected by the African American populace it could lead to a sustained uprising of America’s most marginalized and maligned national minority – Africans in America.  Barely ten months old, in August, 1967, the BPP became the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) major target in its expanding counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) against the Black Liberation movement.  The stated purpose of the program according to an August 25, 1967 document was to “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize” Black organizations and their leadership.  In March 1968, the program was further expanded to 43 FBI field offices.   Those offices were ordered to develop counterintelligence operations designed to prevent the “coalition” of black groups as well as the rise of a “messiah” that would unify the movement.[4]    The FBI was also very concerned about the spread of revolutionary ideology among youth.    As candidly put by in April 1968 by the FBI’s San Francisco field office, COINTELPRO must convince youth to buy into the system:
The Negro youth and moderate must be made to understand that if they succumb to revolutionary teaching, they will be dead revolutionaries.  Is it not better to be a sports hero, a well-paid professional athlete or entertainer or a regularly paid white or blue collar worker, a peaceful human being with a family, or a person who is at least being accepted than a Negro who may have gotten even with the Establishment by burning it down, but who along with this, burned down his own home and gained for him and all his people the hatred and distrust of the whites for years to come?[5]

What started out as a general repressive and surveillance program in 1967, by mid-1968, became a campaign to destroy the BPP and its ideology of armed resistance to racist violence.  The Black Panther Party was the chief target of COINTELPRO.[6]  According to a 1976 Senate Report (The Church Committee), the Black Panther Party was targeted in 90% of all COINTELPRO actions directed at the Black liberation movement.  Some of the actions included forcing churches and schools to evict the breakfast program, sending spurious notes to contributors threatening violence, placing false stories in newspapers, manipulating fund raising, using informants to spread false rumors, and other disinformation machinations.  BPP members were arrested on the street for selling the newspaper.  Police conducted interrogations with no legal basis.  In all of this, local police played an integral role. [7]   As noted in an FBI Airtel on December 2, 1968 “every effort is being made to misdirect the activities of the BPP on a daily basis.”   Apartments and offices were regularly subjected to search.  There were spurious arrests.  All BPP offices, and many homes, were subjected to warrantless (and illegal) wiretaps. The organization was flooded with informants and police agents who worked as provocateurs by the FBI informant.  A few days later the BPP office in Los Angeles was attacked by police.
False criminal charges were also lodged against BPP local and regional leaders.  In April, 1969, 21 leading Cadre members of the New York City Chapter of the Black Panther Party (author included) were indicted and arrested on conspiracy charges.  The so-called “Panther 21” case was based solely on the allegations of three undercover NYPD officers who posed as Panther members.   One of these undercover Black “BOSSI” operative, Detective Gene Roberts, had years earlier infiltrated Malcolm X’s organization the OAAU and was on Malcolm’s security detail at the Audubon Ballroom when Malcolm was gunned downed and killed. The entire Harlem, New York, Chapter leadership, and its Regional Field Secretary, Dhoruba Bin-Wahad, were incarcerated.  It was at this juncture in the covert and overt repression of the BPP that Assata Shakur, then a student at City College of New York, became active in BPP programs as an NCCF medical cadre in Harlem’s Washington Heights.[8]
Despite escalating state repression and attacks by various Black groups and Black intelligentsia the BPP’s influence continued to grow with each police and reactionary attack on its members and programs.  What was once a local BPP newsletter became the “Black Community News Service” and the voice as well as the revolutionary image of the BPP.  Sales of the BPP newspaper skyrocketed becoming primary funding source for BPP operations.[9]  After the Sacramento BPP armed demonstration, the Party dropped the hyphenated “for self-defense.” The BPP began national organizing efforts to unify the Radical Left in America in a common “front” against Police brutality in early 1968.
Despite the Race and Class analysis that drove BPP activities, the organization and the Black Liberation movements were ill-prepared to cope with the historic moment. The BPP’s strategic vision by late 1968 became increasingly focused  on the burgeoning Corporate Police state and what its leading members saw as the precipitous consolidation of Corporate, Military, and Police power that would criminalize and crush future civil unrest, and politically redirect popular anti-war sentiment into more “institutional” avenues reforms.  The slogan and war cry of the BPP, “Power to the People, Black Power to Black People” had distilled in a few words, accompanied by a clinched fist, the sentiments of millions of people who felt controlled and exploited by the white supremacist state, culture, and political system.  But slogans only reflect not change reality.  The BPP and all progressive movements of the period were living on the cusp of the historic reformation of two systems of Economic and Political control: Corporate/Capitalist Democracy and Authoritarian State Socialism.  Both systems, fundamentally hierarchal and elitist, would ultimately coalesce into variations of National-Security State Model that typify both so called “democratic” and “authoritarian” states today.
CREATING A NEW GENERATION OF BLACK REFORM
Before stepping down as President, Lyndon B. Johnson (after consultation with  “Black Leaders” businessmen, and politicians) launched his “War on Poverty” opening up the coffers of the government to anyone who could calm the Ghetto Fires (rebellions) that each year consumed urban America and tarnished the image of the US as a democracy. Employing government and corporate largess to capital-starved Black inner city communities had immediate political consequences.  Radical change was out – and liberal reformism was in.   The class nature of many Black institutions became the determining factor in race politics. The dividing of the Black Liberation and Civil Rights movement along class lines would mean that the Panther’s faced immediate and imminent class opposition from newly minted “anti-poverty pimps,” and apolitical organizations eager for government funding –the launching of the War on Poverty, significantly affected the grassroots Black narrative of Black Power versus integration politics and African American subservience to the Two Party system. The money and “access” to White Corporate America provided under War On Poverty was just what the doctor ordered to wean  marginal Black middle-class Blacks off any radical notions of collective empowerment rather than selfish individualism.   But the BPP was not reformist.  Alongside its reformist community programs were calls for a revolution and advocacy of radical transformation of U.S. society.  But unlike many leading “Civil Rights” organizations of the time, the BPP believed  only with a Revolution of values and radical change of political power in the dominant  White society could Black political self-determination occur.  In the politically expedient embrace of Johnson’s : “Great Society” and Civil Rights legislation, Richard Nixon ascended to the U.S. Presidency and immediately pushed  through a compliant Congress the 1968 Omnibus Crime Bill, thereby providing Law Enforcement with additional tools for containment of racial unrest under the pretext of the “war on crime.”  
There was also police murder and violence.  For example, on December 4, 1969, Chicago police, aided by information provided by an FBI informant, fired hundreds of rounds into the BPP office killing Chairman Fred Hampton and BPP member Mark Clark.  Fred Hampton was killed as he lay in his bed, drugged from the seconol secretly given to him. The US government understood that the Panthers, unlike the majority of African American Civil and Human Rights organizations, clearly understood the crucial and pivotal issue of racist violence in America and its deep connection to the State and its “Criminal Justice System.” Consequently the Panther’s perception of  organized armed resistance to state repression, terrorism, and criminalization of Black Youth as essentially a strategy  of “imposition of political consequences” for state sponsored terrorism, as necessary to any people’s struggle for freedom from a powerfully entrenched and violent adversary as non-violent mass protests. History supported the Panther’s perception, whenever people, the lower classes, exploited and disenfranchised rise up against their rulers inevitably the police/military apparatus of the State violently repress any popular uprising, movement, civil disobedience that threatens the existing order. 
The attempt by the California to execute the leader of the BPP marked the beginning of coordinated national police campaign to eliminate the Panther’s local and regional leadership.  By 1969 the popularity of the BPP extended far beyond inner city neighborhoods.  Functional alliances were formed that were based on professed principles derived from anti-imperialist and Afrocentric Liberation Movements (the latter an ongoing radicalization of Malcolm X’s internationalist concepts) accompanied with a class analysis oriented in African American experience.  This led to other “national minorities” forming “cadre” like Community Defense formations along the lines of the BPP: The Brown Berets (Chicano/Mexicano), The Young Lords Party, (Puerto Rican), The Young Patriot Party (Working Class/Student White Youth), are most commonly known.  By mid sixty-nine, the BPP, put out a national call for a “United Front Against Fascism” that challenged the Radical Left in general and the Black Nationalist Movement in particular to build in their communities democratic and institutional frameworks to combat the militarization of police and state repression. 
But the BPP had to respond to the infiltration, police raids on its offices, targeted assassination of its leaders, prosecution of its leaders, and suppression of its major source of income, the Black Panther Newspaper.  Its first response to state repression was to “close the Party” to new membership.  This would be organizational anathema for a “mass-based political party” – but the BPP was no ordinary “mass political party” or Left Radical Formation.  The BPP, circa 1966-1971 was a paramilitary political as well as socio-cultural formation that by default represented the historical armed resistance to violent white supremacy in America.  Understood in these terms,  it’s self-evident that the BPP was not  armed for revolutionary theatre, macho posturing, or for publicity, but to assert in the most direct terms possible Black people’s right to resist racist attack and/or police repression.  Given the huge disparity between the power of the state and a small civilian organization, the BPP’s survival required and generated an underground component; a clandestine capability to achieve and underscore the political and strategic objectives of the Party.  Although the BPP was popular it could be physically eradicated and isolated if it did not expand its influence and support base.   As it were, from the BPP’s call for radical unity against the burgeoning power of the police/militarized state emerged Radical Left and Black Militant coalitions designated the “National Committees to Combat Fascism.”  NCCF chapters blossomed across the U.S.  in places where BPP chapters had either been depleted by police attack, or none had existed. The timeliness of the call to political arms against rising police state style repression was evident by the fact that radical Whites, progressive students, organized their own NCCF chapters where they struggled and lived. This BPP strategy to build a broader radical “United Front Against Fascism” and consolidate the prevailing anti-establishment Youth culture behind their leadership, e.g., Black Liberation movement, and a politically insurgent “Black Power” movement was only partially successful but nonetheless alarmed Law Enforcement and discomfited their Black collaborators. [10]   The NYPD, in particular, noted with alarm, the BPP/NCCF-led effort to decentralize police departments in major cities.[11]
The FBI’s fear index of the BPP increased geometrically in proportion to the effectiveness of the BPP’s political influence over a broad spectrum of Americas anti-war New Left and the public adulation by a significant segment of African American people. BPP international solidarity with the Cuban Revolution, Palestinian People’s Struggle for Self-determination, and direct relations with anti-imperialist Liberation movements on the African continent were equally alarming, and the Party’s penetration of the US military as well as its connection to European Left and Student movements, sounded the alarm and drew the scrutiny of agencies outside of domestic law enforcement.  U.S. Military Intelligence Units, the CIA, U.S. State Department all targeted and monitored BPP international activities.
Achieving Legal and Moral Legitimacy by Rewriting and Ignoring the Conditions and History of Racial Repression and Black Self-defense
By May of 1971, despite the considerable amount of funds and support cases such as the Panther 21 trial had raised for the Party, and the International success of the Free Huey Campaign that resulted in Newton’s acquittal and release from jail, BPP resources were depleted and programs cut back due to the relentless overt and covert Police attacks and prosecutions.   COINTELPRO operations continued and escalated.   Exacerbating regional, personal and political differences, the FBI had embarked upon a plan, an eventually successful one, to split the Black Panther Party into two factions, one on the west coast commonly called the “Newton” faction and one of the east coast commonly called the “Cleaver” faction after Eldridge Cleaver.[12]  While many debate whether the split would have occurred even without FBI instigation, it is beyond dispute that the FBI and local law enforcement played a central role in making the split a violent one.  Using information gleaned from their wiretaps and using informants, the FBI created a mindset within the BPP that leaders of one faction were intent on killing the other.  As one FBI document noted
It appears that [Huey P.] Newton responds violently to any question of his actions or policies or reluctance to do his bidding.  He obviously responds hastily without getting all the facts or consulting with others.

            The Bureau feels that this near hysterical reaction by the egotistical Newton is triggered by any criticism of his activity, policies or leadership qualities and some of this criticism undoubtedly is result of our counterintelligence projects now in operation.  This present chaotic situation within the BPP must be exploited and recipients must maintain the present high level of counterintelligence activity.[13]

  Those operations did result in deaths.  Fred Bennett, Robert Webb and Sam Napier were three of those victims.  In an April 5, 1971 FBI memorandum, the New York office gleefully reported that the “dichotomy” in the BPP created by COINTELPRO had resulted in the death of Webb, apparently by Newton supporters.  But the FBI lamented that with the confusion in the BPP and many east coast members choosing to go underground, it was now difficult to engage in COINTELPRO-like activities.   They noted that it would obviously be “detrimental to the continuing efforts of [COINTELPRO]” should the two factions reach a détente.[14] 
The BPP’s principled stand on the right of Blacks to defend themselves had responded to legalized racist repression by deepening and resourcing the BPP’s clandestine organization.  Self-defense in face of violent state repression could not remain reactionary, passive.  Self-Defense had become proactive, retaliatory, a political consequence “illegal” resistance to “legal injustice.”  Armed struggle against State and Rightwing racist violence and Criminal elements that profited from the debilitation of the Black community, e.g., Heroin, Cocaine, Dealers and Street-sets terrorizing Black neighborhoods developed as the distinct adaptation of East Coast Panthers to COINTELRPO targeting the New York 21, Geronimo Pratt, and the International Section of the BPP led by Eldridge Cleaver.   The Black Liberation Army (BLA) was the conscious response of those targeted by COINTELPRO for police style assassination, or imprisonment.  Some BPP members fled underground to avoid the COINTELPRO-inspired violence, two examples were Zayd Malik Shakur, former NY Chapter Deputy Minister of Information and Sundiata Acoli, a Panther 21 member. Both Shakur (who was killed) and Sundiata (captured) were with Assata Shakur when she was shot and wounded on the NJ Turnpike.  Others chose to go underground to further revolutionary activity; many current Political Prisoners with their activism rooted in the BPP/BLA are of this category. 


Black Liberation Army – Striking Back
In the spring of 1971, there was a series of shootings of police in New York City.   Other armed attacks occurred in California and elsewhere. In communiqués received by the media, the “Black Liberation Army” claimed responsibility for those attacks.  In response, President Richard Nixon ordered a “full-out” law enforcement effort to capture former BPP members who might have been involved in the attacks.  The initial investigation, called “Newkill” was a joint FBI-NYPD effort that became a model for later incarnations such as the “Joint Terrorism Taskforce.”[15]  FBI agents who were involved in COINTELPRO became part of Newkill.   BPP members who were then underground – and many who were not – were considered “logical suspects and targeted for arrest.  The Director ordered the New York FBI Office to
Review appropriate files of black extremist organizations, including those of so-called Third World groups to develop logical suspects.  Include those organizations and their leaders in target assignments given to sources.  Consider the possibility that both attacks may be result of revenge taken against New York City Police by the Black Panther Party as a result of its arrest of BPP members in April, 1969….[16]

 Assata Shakur aligned herself with East Coast “Cleaver” faction and though never a formally a COINTELRPO target, she became a primary target of the FBI’s post- COINTRELPRO anti urban-terrorism investigations collectively labeled under her name (Joanne Chesimard) as “Chesrob.”  Chesrob became a national anti-urban guerilla investigation aimed directly at destroying BLA soldiers and their clandestine infrastructure. By early 1972, the media labeled her the “soul” on the Black Liberation Army.  She was labeled a suspect in virtually every New York City bank robbery where a woman was thought to have participated.  Although “Chesrob” was denominated an FBI bank robbery investigation, it was really another coordinated NYPD-FBI effort to capture or kill underground BPP members and BLA members.
In a few short years, former BPP members and BLA soldiers Harold Russell, Woody Green, Anthony Kimu White and Twyman Meyers were killed during armed confrontations with the police.  Others were arrested, tried and convicted for incidents claimed by or thought to be committed by the BLA. [17]  It mattered not to prosecuting agencies whether those arrested were legally “guilty” or “not guilty.”  What was important was the counter-insurgency effort that was begun under COINTELPRO and continued under programs such as Newkill and Chesrob could cover their racist repression of former BPP members and their supporters with  criminal  charges and prosecutions and avoid emotional and cumbersome conspiracy trials the lend themselves to acquittal of the defendants.  
It is in this context that Assata Shakur’s May 2, 1973 arrest on the New Jersey Turnpike must be viewed.  Along with BPP members Zayd Malik Shakur and Sundiata Acoli (an acquitted Panther 21 defendant, former NASA employee and computer genius) she was stopped on the New Jersey Turnpike for “driving while Black.”    It is likely that the troopers learned the identities of those in the car shortly after it was stopped.  In any event, a shootout erupted.  Zayd Malik Shakur and one trooper were killed.  Assata was shot while her hands were in the air attempting to surrender.  She was arrested.  Sundiata Acoli, though injured, managed to escape but was caught a few days later.
Assata was then tried for the numerous acts where she was suspected.  All resulted in acquittals or dismissals.  It was the May 2, 1973 incident that gave rise to her only conviction and life sentence.  Sundiata Acoli was also convicted in a separate trial and sentenced to life.  She was liberated from her New Jersey prison in November 1979 and eventually surfaced in Cuba where she was granted political asylum.
            Assata and her legal advisors can and should use any available means and arguments to keep her safe and free. But everyone else, supporters, and those only interested in justice and an end to racist and political repression should, as a matter of principle, place her case, and the “terrorist” designation placed on her by the FBI in its proper context: as the continuation of criminalization and demonization of the Black Liberation Movement.   Assata’s guilt or innocence of the actual charges is totally and absolutely irrelevant.  Assata was part of a movement that sustained and suffered massive police and state repression under COINTELPRO, Newkill and Chesrob.  This movement for Black Self-determination, the right to control institutions within the Black community and the Right to self-defense,” was declared “terrorist” by the U.S. Government’s Law Enforcement agencies charged with executing its racist and political destruction.   With its recent posting of Assata Shakur on America’s top ten most wanted terrorists list, U.S. Law Enforcement and the U.S. Justice department are reaffirming their past illegal policies of domestic repression of political dissent, racial and religious demonization of minority and immigrant populations,  This is the political message that this labeling carries.  It is our job to flatly reject that argument and to re-affirm the right of Black people and all people of color to self- determination.  While it is true Assata Shakur is the victim of an injustice but that injustice is not administered from state, but by her so-called supporters, progressive Civil Libertarians, and Black cultural figures who proclaim her “innocence” and dismiss the movement from which she emerged as a mere “Law Enforcement” fantasy propounded to rationalize their illegal police actions under the color of law.   Assata Shakur, in a so-called post-racial era is made into a Black Madonna of abstract resistance –disconnected as an activist, freedom fighter, and soldier of a legitimate anti-racist and anti-imperialist movement. Clearly such disconnect is in the political eye of the beholders and not derived from the actual history of a radical movement.   Progressives and Civil Libertarian must understand that  what happened to Asaata was but a series of episodes during a systemic and coordinated campaign to crush a domestic revolutionary movement.   A state of war existed between the state and that movement.  The State succeeded in smashing the movement and its absence today should not serve as a license for political opportunism, to exploit and misinterpret the past to suit individual agendas or characterize one’s politics.  Most of the Political Prisoners in American jails come from the BPP/BLA and Black Nationalist movement. The System of visible and hidden racist control of African Americans that brought that movement into existence still persists, and because it persists who the Black Political Prisoners are not an unprincipled issue up for reinterpretation.  All Black Political Prisoners should be supported, not based on their guilt or innocence, but based on the historical reality that their actions and current conditions of confinement were, and are, premised on their past relationship to a movement targeted by law enforcement and various agencies of the state, and that targeting was illegal, violent, and permanent.
It is for this reason that we cannot get mired in a debate over legal “guilt” or “innocence.”  Was Nelson Mandela less a Political Prisoner worthy of freedom because he engaged in armed actions?  In this country, the successful campaign to free the Puerto Rican political prisoners who were granted clemency by Bill Clinton provides an example.  The campaign to free them did not admit or deny that they were “guilty” of seditious conspiracy or committed the acts attributed to them.  Rather it emphasized that they are not “criminals” or “terrorists” but one part of the struggle over Puerto Rico’s destiny.
            Although there are differences the political characterization of Assata’s as a terrorist and the cases of the Black political prisoners (her comrades) still in jail must be the same: they were/are part of a legitimate political movement for human rights and self-determination.  Many of the BPP political prisoners from the era remain in jail.  Marshall Eddie Conway: 43 years; Anthony Jalil Bottom: 42 years; Sundiata Acoli: 40 years; Robert Seth Hayes: 41 years; Herman Bell: 40 years, Russell Maroon Shoatz: 40 years; Sekou Odinga: 32 years and Abdul Majid: 31 years.  Albert Nuh Washington, Teddy Jah Heath, and  Basheer Hameed died in prison after serving decades.  Many of the arrested BPP/BLA members had trials characterized by gross violations of due process and that took place at a time when COINTELPRO disclosures had yet been made.  But only two, Dhoruba Bin-Wahad (the author) and Geronimo Pratt were able to secure reversals and secure their freedom from imprisonment.  
            But once again, the issue after 40 or more years is not guilt or innocence or whether the trials were fair.  These prisoners were and are part of a movement and, after all of this time, should be freed irrespective of their legal guilt or innocence.  To achieve this, the “terrorist” label must be challenged not on an individual basis but politically and in correct historical context.  Reconciling the so called “excesses” of the past with the reality of Post Patriot Act America is a specious proposition at best.  But to  forthrightly declare that all Political Prisoners must be set free as one of many democratic principles of a mass campaign to curtail the political power of law enforcement would seem more likely to succeed  in Freeing all political prisoners and changing Assata’s status as a Refugee from American racial repression.
Dhoruba Bin-Wahad
Former Field Secretary BPP NY,
Political Prisoner (19 Years)
Director IDPAP, GH
.
The author wishes to acknowledge Robert J. Boyle, Esq. who contributed research and documents for this article... [16] See FBI teletype dated May 25, 1971 from the Director to New York.  The arrest of BPP members in April 1969 is a reference to the Panther 21 conspiracy case.  All of those that had gone to trial were acquitted on May 13, 1971.
[17] These include Albert Nuh Washington, Anthony Jalil Bottom, Herman Bell, Henry Sha Sha Brown, Teddy Jah Heath, Robert Seth Hayes, Safiya Bukhari, Ashanti Alston, Victor Cumberbatch, Oscar Washington and Dhoruba Bin Wahad, author of this article

Monday, October 14, 2013

Rejecting The Laws of Empire - Romaine Chip Fitzgerald

The laws that govern, protect and promote the economic and political interests of the U.S. Empire are not of the people, or by the people. The historical record says that this country was founded by and for wealthy white men to the exclusion of women and people of color. Women and people of color totaling the majority of the population of the colonial territories had nothing to do with the framing or content of the Declaration of Independence or the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, with regard to the state — the U.S. Empire — there are no laws the people are bound to respect. The people are politically correct to reject the laws not of their making.

The historical evidence suggests that the laws authored by the Founding Fathers and their wealthy white male contemporaries were for the purpose of facilitating and protecting the capitalist mode of production and distribution of wealth, and to maintain the political supremacy of the white male hierarchy. And although this social and political experiment called the U.S. began in the period of 1776, the distance of time and space between the past and present, does not diminish the purpose nor intent of the laws that were designed for the domination of capital and white men. (Certainly, there was a prevailing sense of entitlement to social and political supremacy and privilege among the ruling class of the Founding Fathers by virtue of their literacy, and their control of the science and technologies of the era. The sentiments of women and people of color were simply not factored into the decision making process.)

Rational beings don’t subscribe to the proposition that the political and military might of the corporate ruling circle here in the Twenty First Century, here in the modern era, makes them right, or entitles them to define universal reality. A liberated people exercises choices, decisions, and actions independent of the influences of a culture of sociopathic greed and Western supremacy. Rational beings are uncompromising in their rejection of the Laws of Empire!
With compassion and solidarity! - Romaine Chip Fitzgerald August 1st 2013 published 

Thursday, October 10, 2013

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE "N" WORD N-G-R

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE "N" WORD HAD A CONNOTATION CONNECTED TO THE GODS
The word "nig..." used to be the most revered and sacred word in the universe. It was the "devine epithet," and the people who began using the mother of all words that originated from this word which was sullied by the British, were the ancient Egyptians or better, the Khemites, who called their land, "Khemet" or "The Black Land," and also used the name, "Ta-merri" or "The Beloved Land."
THE WORD "N-G-R" MEANS "GOD" IN ANCIENT EGYPTIAN

The father of the "n" word was the word used by the ancient Egyptians for "God." That word was "N-g-r" and as one can see, there are no vowels in this word. In the ancient African and even the present African languages (the Afro-Asiatic linguistic family) vowels such as "a,e,i,o,u" are not found in many translations, particularly of ancient Hebrew and Egyptian languages.
In the translation of ancient Egyptian and Hebrew (which is heavily influenced by Egyptian), one will not always find vowels, therefore, very few people will realize that the word for God, which is "N-g-r" pronounced "en-ger" was the Egyptian word for God. In fact, the Egyptian word for "nature," is also the word used for God. That word is "ntyr," (pronounced net-jer." Now prounce the word "nigg.." and the word "net-jer," and one sees the clear connection.
MANY AFRICAN WORDS DENOTING PEOPLE OR IMPORTANT PEOPLE STARTS WITH "N"
In many African languages particularly the Niger-Congo language family. Words that connects with people, Gods, and groups begin with "n" and that word is always the first word. For instance, the word "Nkosi" in Xhosa is "God." The word "Ndaba," in another South African language is "counsil" (or gathering of elders). Many common names also begin with "N".
WORDS OF AFRICAN ORIGINS THAT CAME FROM THE ORIGINAL WORD, "N-G-R" (PROUNOUNCED EN-JER

N-g-r (Egyptian;pronounced en-jer) = God
N-t-y-r (Egypt; pronounced net-ger) = God, Devine
Negash (Ethiopia; ne-gash) = King
Negus (Ethiopia; ne-goos) = Emperor
Nkosi (Xhosa; en-kosi) = God
Ndaba (Zulu; en-daba) = Counsil/Officials,
Naga (East Indian, Nubian = People
Nugarmarta (West African = People (See the writings of Ibn Buttata's journey to West Africa)
HOW THE N BECAME CORRUPTED
The Romans are probably the first Europeans to misrepresent the word for God, which was "N-g-r"
About the early part of the First Century, Romans tried to invade Ethiopia. (see BLACK HISTORY CHART http://community.webtv.net/nubianem/blackworldnubianempire or go to http://community.webtv.net/paulnubiaempire for a list of Nubian Pharaohs and Queens

The Romans who were speakers of Latin always knew of Blacks, there were Blacks in Rome, Italy had an ancient Black presence long before the Latins migrated from Central Asia and North Eastern Europe during the 'Aryan' migrations. In fact, the Latin ethnic groups is still in existance in the northern part of Italy even today. This part of Italy still grips about Hannibal's invasion which happened about two thousand two hundred years ago!!!!
The Romans had a name for Blacks, it was "Niger" and it meant Black or people of African origins. Thus, Septimus Niger would have meant, Septimus the Negro. Yet, how did the Romans connect the word "Niger" to Black.
In ancient times, Blacks were worshipped as Gods. The Gods of Greece came from Egypt. The worship of the Black Madonna is connected with the worship of Isis, the Egyptian Goddes. Moreover, Blacks in Egypt called their Pharaohs "En-ger" or "N-g-r" he was literally referred to as "THE GOD."
It is very possible that when the Romans tried to invade Nubia, they asked for the name of the God and the term "N-g-r" was probably used in place of "leader" or "king". In Angola, the same also happened during the 1600's when the word "N-gola" which means "King" (notice the "N" and the "g" in this word as well), came to be "Angola,' the name of a kingdom in south western Africa.
(Read more on Nubian, Egyptian, West African and ancient American trade and commercial connections in ancient times; see the book, "Susu Economics: The History of Pan-African Trade, Commerce, Money and Wealth," published by 1stBooks Library, www.1stbooks.com also see www.barnesandnoble.com

WHERE DID THE ROMANS FIRST HEAR THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE "N" WORD.
A Roman general invading Nubia from Egypt would probably have used the Egyptian term for Pharaoh, which was "N-g-r" (God). This term then was used to refer to all Blacks and as time went by, the word N-g-r became Niger. In Fact, the Romans also classified their Emperors as "Gods," to follow the Egyptian style. Moreover, as the History Channel poointed out, "Rome was a collection of villages before the Egyptians built it up."(paraphrased).
The word "em-peror" sounds very close to the word "en-jer." That is not a coincidental connection.
THE WORD "N-G-R" (EN-JER) AFTER IT WAS CORRUPTED BY THE EUROPEANS
Niger = (Latin or Black/African pronounced "ni-ger.")
Nero = Italian for Black
Negre = French for Black
Negro = Spanish for Black
The English called Blacks "Moore" or "Black-a-Moore" before they began using the word
"Negro" to refer to Blacks. FROM THAT WORD CAME THE RACIAL EPITHET, "NIGG.


In like manner, the racist term for Japanese the mutilation of the word to shorten it into an epithet. Furthermore, the original name for Japan is the Chinese "Ni-Han." Now here is another great mystry that people who study the Niger-Congo linguistic family would quickly notice. EVEN THE WORD "Ni" in the Chinese "Ni-Han," has and ancient African connection. In fact, as Clyde Walters points out, The Chinese language is directly related to the Niger-Congo language which has its roots in the Cameroon region of Africa. In fact, there are thousands of African words from Cameroon to Kenya that have both prefixes and suffixes that are identical to both Chinese and Japanese languages (see also African Presence in Early Asia, by Ivan Van Sertima; Transaction Publishers)
In the Case of "Ni-Han" which may mean "rising sun," there is also a sacred meaning that is found in the word "n-ger," or "ne-gro." Yet, the racist terms "nip," and "nigg..." or "jap," used by racists were and are being used without any understanding of their original meanings. Only hatred and envy comes out of the mouths of those who use racial epithets in their attempt to insult and denegrade others. However, it is up to us to study our history and make these racist words impotent, while at the same time, understanding their original meaning.

Connection with the prefix "ni" with sacred and life:
Ni'le = The Nile River, Life to the Egyptians
Ni-ger = River in West Africa
Niger = Nation in West Africa
Nigeria = Nation in West Africa
Nago = Racist term used by some SE Asians to refer to Black Melanesians of Africoid origins
Nago-Mina = African nationality in Nigeria
Naghual = Aztec word for Shaman or priest. The first Olmec Shamans in Mexico came from Nigeria and elsewhere in West Africa (see Black Civilizations of America http://community.webtv.net/paulnubiaempire
THE ORIGINS OF THE TERM "HUN."
The racist term for whites also comes from a word that struck fear in the hearts of whites during the ancint times. That word is "Hun." The Huns were Mongol barbarians from Mongolia who tried to invade China and finally succeeded. THye invaded Eurasia from Russia all the way to Germany and mixed in with the Caucasians. Hence, the British began calling Germans the term "Hun."
The countries of Hungary, East Germany, northern Italy, Russia, Poland and much of Eastern Europe is mixed with the Mongol invaders. There were Mongol invaders in Turkey, Afghanistan, India, and many nations.
THE MONGOLS WERE DEFEATED BY NUBIANS AND MAMELUKES 



When the Huns tried to invade Egypt (sometime in the 1100's), they were met by a strong force of Nubians and Mamelukes (white slaves from slavic, Turkics from Bosnia, Serbia, Albania, Turkey and such nations), who were soldiers for the Egyptian rulers. The Mongols were defeated and that was the end of the Mongol Empire. Moreover, they were thinly spread over Eurasia. They also met a crack cavalry of Nubian horsemen and archers, who had a tradition of archery that extends way back to ancient Egyptian times.
When one studies the history of the Huns in Europe, it is one of the most horrible genocides that existed (the genocide against Black Sudras and Black Australoids in India is another great genocide; see "Sudrology, http://dalitstan.org )
The huns ravaged Europe and are said to spread the blacck plague by shooting plague infested rats in the walled towns of the Europeans to infest them.
WE MUST STUDY OUR HISTORY IN ORDER TO DEVELOP OUR CONSCIOUSNESS AND MAKE PEOPLE'S RACIST REMARKS IMPOTENT


We must study our history. It is by knowing who we are that racist remarks and racial epithets will become impotent. Every time one uses the word "nigg..." to refer to a Black person, they are actually calling that person "God." When we Blacks say that our Afro's and locks are "natural," we don't realize the significance of the word or the true meaning. But something in our consciousness simply cannot be destroyed. To say we are going "natural," means we are going back to being "gods," because the word "natural," comes from the original Egyptian word, "n-t-y-r" which means "God." The ancient Egyptians used a similar word to call their Pharoahs. That word was "N-g-r." The word "Pharaoh," was never used to refer to any Egyptian King. Pharaoh came from the word "Per-o" which was the term for the Great Temple, where the King lived.

Friday, September 27, 2013

Fanon and Cabral : A contrast in theories of revolution for Africa

LENIN set the tone for most successful revolutions in the twentieth
century when he altered traditional Marxism to suit the conditions of
Russia. Mao Tse-tung followed Lenin's example when he too adjusted
Marxism (and Leninism) to a Chinese environment. It seems to follow,
therefore, that attempts at revolution everywhere should not be mere
imitations of previously successful upheavals but should, instead, be
tailored to fit specific circumstances. Thus, African revolutions should
be made on the basis of African conditions. But such conditions are not,
in general, always easy to discern, nor are separate analyses of those
conditions certain to be similar. This is especially true of the theories of
revolution of two of the most important and influential figures in recent
African history: Frantz Fanon (1925-61) and Amilcar Cabral (I925-
73).

Although a native of Martinique, Fanon's ancestry was African. He
studied medicine in France, became a psychiatrist, and then practiced
in Algeria where he soon found himself involved in the Algerian
Revolution. Fanon's thoughts on revolution were based mainly upon his
knowledge of and experience in much of Africa, especially Algeria.l
Cabral was the organiser and leader of the revolution in the country
of his birth, Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portuguese Guinea). His theories
were a result of his experiences, beginning as a student in Lisbon,
continuing as an agronomist who surveyed the agricultural resources

* Associate Professor of History at California State College, San Bernardino, and co-editor
(with Clifford T. Paynton) of Why Revolution? theories and analyses (Cambridge, Mass., I97I).
1 Fanon's life and thought may be surveyed in the following: G. K. Grohs, 'Frantz
Fanon and the African Revolution', in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge),
vi, 4, December 1968, pp. 543-56; David Caute, Frantz Fanon (New York, 1970); Renate
Zahar, L'Oeuvre de Frantz Fanon (Paris, 1970); Peter Geismar, Fanon (New York, I971);
Pierre Bouvier, Fanon (Paris, 1971); Philippe Lucas, Sociologie deFrantz Fanon (Algiers, 197I);
Paul A. Beckett, 'Frantz Fanon and Sub-Saharan Africa: notes on the contemporary
significance of his thought', in Africa Today (Denver), xIx, 2, Spring 1972, pp. 59-72;
Emmanuel Obiechina, 'Frantz Fanon', in Ufahamu (Los Angeles), III, 2, Fall I972, pp. 97-
116; Irene L. Gendzier, Frantz Fanon: a critical study (New York, 1973); and L. Adele Jinadu,
'Some Aspects of the Political Philosophy of Frantz Fanon', in African Studies Review (East
Lansing), xvi, 2, September I973, pp. 255-89. ROBERT BLACKEY
of his country for the Portuguese Government, and concluding as a
nationalist and revolutionist.1 Both Fanon and Cabral dealt with many
of the aspects of revolution, the former more as an abstract theorist, the
latter more as a party organiser. They examined the nature of revolu-
tion in Africa, the social structure, the utility of party and leadership,
the value of violence, and the role of culture, while they also speculated
upon post-revolutionary society.


The purpose of this article is to discuss and illustrate the differences
and similarities between the theories of these outstanding and original
revolutionists. While it will be the task of others to determine where the
ideas of one or the other, or of anyone else for that matter, are especially
applicable to a given African situation, it is hoped that this attempt at
contrast will be a contribution towards understanding African revolu.
tions and the continent's search for identity.

NATURE OF THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION
Fanon and Cabral were essentially men of peace. Neither plunged
immediately into the troubled waters of revolution without first trying
more tranquil currents. Fanon practised at a hospital in Algeria and
tried to work through legitimate channels before he felt compelled to
join the rebels. He explained his position in his letter of resignation
from the hospital at Blida in I956: 'The function of a social structure
is to set up institutions to serve man's needs. A society that drives its
members to desperate solutions is a nonviable society, a society to be
replaced.'2 In the same year a handful of men led by Cabral formed
the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
(P.A.I.G.C.) - the Cape Verde Islands are some 600 miles off-shore and
considered part of Guinea-Bissau. Earlier attempts at reform had failed,
but for three years the P.A.I.G.C. employed peaceful means to gain
independence. When this also proved unsuccessful other means had to
1 Although there is no biography of Cabral his ideas are discussed in the following:
Ronald H. Chilcote, 'The Political Thought of Amilcar Cabral', in The Journal of Modern
African Studies, vI, 3, October I968, pp. 373-88; Gerard Chaliand, Armed Struggle in Africa:
with the guerrillas in 'Portuguese' Guinea (New York, 1969); Basil Davidson, The Liberation of
Guine: aspects of an African revolution (Baltimore, 1969); Bernard Magubane, 'Amilcar Cabral:
evolution of revolutionary thought', in Ufahamu, II, 2, Fall 197 , pp. 7 I-87; Eduardo Ferreira,
'Theory of Revolution and Background to his Assassination', in Ufahamu, II, 3, Winter 1973,
pp. 49-68; Maryinez L. Hubbard, 'Culture and History in a Revolutionary Context:
approaches to Amilcar Cabral', in Ufahamu, III, 3, Winter 1973, pp. 69-86; and Charles
McCollester, 'The Political Thought of Amilcar Cabral', in The Monthly Review (New York),
xxIV, 10, March I973, pp. Io-21.
2 Frantz Fanon, 'Letter to the Resident Minister' (X956), in Toward the African Revolution


CONTRAST IN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION FOR AFRICA I93
be employed. 'In the beginning', wrote Cabral, 'we thought it would
be possible to fight in the towns, using the experiences of other countries,
but that was a mistake. We tried strikes and demonstrations, but ...
realized this would not work.'l At these points both men became
revolutionists.
On the nature of the African revolution Fanon and Cabral were in
general agreement, differing only over emphasis and detail, some of
which, however, is very important. Of the two, Cabral was far more
explicit, but both expected revolution to be more than just a struggle
for independence. For Fanon, revolution was part of the process of the
regeneration of man and society, of self-liberation and rebirth. Only
through revolution could a suppressed people undo the effects of
colonisation. As a psychiatrist, Fanon was particularly interested in the
psychological effects which revolution would have on the colonised
man. For true liberation to occur, he asserted, independence must be
taken, not merely granted; it must be the work of the oppressed them-
selves. It was through the actual struggle that liberation would come,
restoring integrity and pride, as well as the past and the future. 'True
liberation is not that pseudo-independence in which ministers having
a limited responsibility hobnob with an economy dominated by the
colonial past. Liberation is the total destruction of the colonial system.'2
The oppressed must bring all their resources into play because the
struggle is at once total and absolute.
The African revolution, and the larger liberation struggle of colonial
people everywhere, is the fundamental characteristic of the advance of
history in this century, according to Cabral.3 Such a revolution means
the transformation of life in the direction of progress which, in turn,
means national independence, eliminating all foreign domination, and
carefully selecting friends and watching enemies to ensure progress.
'The national liberation of a people is the regaining of the historical
personality of that people, its return to history through the destruction
of the imperialist domination to which it was subjected.'4 A people
must free the process of development of the national productive
forces. Thus the struggle is not only against colonialism, but against
neo-colonialism as well.
1 Quoted in David A. Andelman, 'Profile: Amilcar Cabral', in Africa Report (New York),
May 1970, p. 19.
2 Fanon, 'Decolonization and Independence' (1958), in Toward the African Revolution,
p. 105.
3 Amilcar Cabral, 'Guinea and Cabo Verde Against Portuguese Colonialism' (1961), in
Revolution in Guinea: selected texts by Amilcar Cabral (New York,. I969), p. I4.
4 Cabral, 'The Weapon of Theory' (I966), in ibid. p. Io2. Cabral possessed a vision that encompassed the broad spectrum of
revolution; he had an appreciation of the crucial everyday work of the
struggle that Fanon lacked. He stressed that revolutionists must not
fight for ideas alone, but for material benefits, improved conditions,
and a better future for children. The fight must not be merely for
abstract ideas of liberty and independence, but for local and pressing
grievances and problems.
National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, working for peace and
progress, independence - all these will be empty words without significance
for the people, unless they are translated into real improvements of the
conditions of life. It is useless to liberate a region, if the people of the region
are then left without the elementary necessities of life.1
In other words, it is through gaining supporters by arguing for local
grievances that revolutionists will open the prospect for a better future
wherein the more abstract ideas could be incorporated.
Proceeding further, Cabral emphasised that although the goal of
national independence was unquestionably vital, the struggle itself, to
be truly successful, must continue on three levels: political action,
armed action, and national reconstruction. This means: (i) that
political work must be maintained at all levels of society to establish and
preserve national unity; (ii) party organisation and discipline must be
strengthened and adjusted to the evolution of the struggle to correct
mistakes and hold leaders to proper principles and goals; (iii) the armed
forces must be strengthened and the enemy isolated; (iv) liberated
areas must be defended, kept tranquil, and developed for the benefit
of the people there; (v) more cadres of complete revolutionists must be
trained to be able to go out in the countryside and educate the people;
and (vi) ties must be strengthened with other African nations, and with
anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist forces everywhere.2
Cabral was thorough as he linked the revolution to the daily needs
of the people. But this might have come to nothing without sufficient
education and preparation beforehand. Here Cabral's contribution to
the concept of revolution is especially valuable and, perhaps, unique.
He used his position as a government agronomist during I952-4 to
travel about his country and acquire an intimate knowledge of the life
of his people, thus laying the groundwork for a later time when he would
combine the theory and practice of revolution: 'nobody has yet made a
successful revolution without a revolutionary theory',3 he said, echoing
1 Cabral (I965), quoted in Lars Rudebeck, 'Political Mobilisation for Development in
Guinea-Bissau', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, x, i, May 1972, p. 3.
2 Cabral, 'The Development of the Struggle' (I968), in Revolution in Guinea, pp. 125 f.
3 Cabral, 'The Weapon of Theory', p. 93.

CONTRAST IN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION FOR AFRICA 195
Lenin. Before the armed struggle was launched, Cabral and his fellow
leaders made a careful analysis of their society; they came to under-
stand the position of the tribal chiefs vis-d-vis the villagers; they exam-
ined the social structure in the towns; they investigated the views of
those who lived without chiefs; and they studied the ways in which
Portuguese colonial exploitation actually affected the every-day life of
the population. This earlier political preparation made the struggle
possible. The tireless work of listening and talking, of directing and
explaining, of relating the P.A.I.G.C. to the people, and vice versa, was
what apparently made the difference between success and failure.
By I960 P.A.I.G.C. members were out in the countryside explaining
their aims and mobilising the people; Cabral had come to believe that
their struggle would need massive rural support before the revolution
began. The small guerrilla band, or foci, as espoused by Che Guevara
and Regis Debray, would not have been enough to spark the struggle.
Instead, a period of two years preparatory political work was under-
taken. This was especially difficult since Guinea-Bissau had an illiteracy
rate of some 99 per cent, a shockingly small number of university
trained men (only 14 prior to I960), and no military academy to teach
tactics and strategy. A political school was founded in Conakry (in the
neighbouring Republic of Guinea) in which, at first, party members
received political instruction and were trained how to mobilise the
masses. Then those peasants and youths who had been recruited went
to the school, whereupon they embarked on an intensive education
programme so that they too could return to the countryside to con-
vince others to join the struggle. The attempt to gain followers avoided
generalisations and pat phrases, using instead questions and informa-
tion that would relate directly to those involved.
We started from the concrete reality of our people. We tried to avoid having
the peasants think that we were outsiders come to teach them how to do
things; we put ourselves in the position of people who came to learn with the
peasants, and in the end the peasants were discovering for themselves why
things had gone badly for them.l
This political preparation was probably the hardest work of the
revolution, but it was also the most useful. By 1962-3 the P.A.I.G.C.
was ready to fight, and the years of preparation proved invaluable.
Fanon, as indicated above, paid little attention to the details of
making a revolution; he was more interested in encouraging their
occurrence. Analysis for the sake of analysis was for intellectuals;
Fanon wrote to arouse, to anger, and to warn against the dangers of
1 Cabral, 'Practical Problems and Tactics' (1968), in Revolution in Guinea, p. I59. I96 ROBERT BLACKEY
exploitation. But he expected the African revolution to proceed along
two stages. First, there would be a period of physical struggle during
which a national programme has to emerge to act as a unifying element
in order to achieve independence. (This was no easy task, and Fanon,
unlike Cabral, did not give it much attention.) Secondly, after inde-
pendence the energies of the revolutionists must be directed into
building a socialist state. Fanon did not encourage a chauvinistic type
of nationalism; as a pan-Africanist he recognised that it was necessary
to hold a people together. But he did favour a nationalism based upon
the genuineness and individuality of the indigenous culture which
would, in turn, unite with other anti-colonial and socialist movements;
such a nationalism, however, has proved elusive.
Fanon's affinity for socialism was, like Cabral's, primarily the result
of circumstance; he was not doctrinaire about it, nor did he feel that
traditional Marxism-Leninism was completely suitable to Africa.
Specifically, neither Marx nor Lenin dealt with the question of race,
probably because it never occurred to them. Fanon took aspects of
Marxism-Leninism and injected the race factor: 'you are rich because
you are white, you are white because you are rich'.l Although he did
not consider himself a Marxist he was sympathetic with the Marxist
approach to revolution. But Fanon emphasised 'underdeveloped
countries' as the agency for change, not 'social class'. Moreover, not
only did Fanon wish to be free from capitalism, but also from any
institutionalised form of communism as well. In fact, it was with
sanguine - though it seems unrealistic - expectations that he looked to
the Third World to create a humanistic society, apart from and inde-
pendent of capitalism and communism.
Cabral similarly did not consider himself a Marxist and modified
Marx on the subject of class in a way only slightly different from
Fanon. 'We agree that history ... is the result of class struggle, but we
have our own class struggles in our own country; the moment imperial-
ism arrived and colonialism arrived, it made us leave our history and
enter another history.'2 Therefore, while the class struggle has con-
tinued it has done so in a modified way. Africa's struggle is against
the ruling class of the imperialist countries; this has given the class
struggle another connotation, and has meant a different evolution for
the African people. 'In colonial conditions no one stratum [or class]
can succeed in the struggle for national liberation on its own, and
1 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York edn., 1968), p. 40.
2 Cabral, 'Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea' (I964), in Revolution in Guinea


CONTRAST IN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION FOR AFRICA I97
therefore it is all the strata [or classes] of society which are the agents
of history.'l Thus, in colonial countries traditional Marxism does not
work; the class struggle does not command history - the entire colonial
state does.
CLASS STRUCTURE
It is in their analysis and discussion of classes where we find the
sharpest contrasts between Fanon and Cabral. It is here that their
fundamental differences lie, and where students of the African revolu-
tion must devote most of their attention, not only in order to make or
understand revolutions, but also because of the foundation 'class'
provides for post-revolutionary society.
There is no doubt that in Africa the peasantry comprises the largest
single group in society. For most of recorded history, as well as for
traditional Marxism, peasants have been the poorest revolutionists.
Fanon recognised their conservatism, and accepted the premise that in
industrial countries they were, generally, the least aware, the worst
organised, and the most reactionary class. Even in the Third World
the peasants were often retrograde and prone to religious fanaticism
and tribal warfare. But in the twentieth century, especially in China
and Vietnam, the peasantry has become revolutionary when provided
with an appropriate ideology, capable leadership, and efficient organ-
isation. Fanon was aware of this, and believed that under stress or
provocation the peasants were capable of uncontrollable rage. Peasants,
he said, had 'bloodthirsty instincts' and were capable of brutality and
violence. Because of this Fanon concluded that they must be an integral
part of the African revolutionary elite since they were the only true and
spontaneously revolutionary force. 'It is clear that in the colonial
countries the peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing
to lose and everything to gain.' Peasants would answer the call of
revolution, thinking of their liberation only in violent terms. 'The
starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the ex-
ploited to discover that only violence pays. For him there is no com-
promise, no possible coming to terms.'2
Fanon also selected the peasants as part of the revolutionary elite
because, in the absence of a significant African proletariat, they were in
1 Ibid. p. 69.
2 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 61. For an evaluation of his views on the peasantry,
as well as on class in general, see B. Marie Perinbam, 'Fanon and the Revolutionary Peasan-
try- the Algerian Case', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, xI, 3, September I973,
pp. 427-45; and Martin Staniland, 'Frantz Fanon and the African Political Class', in
African Affairs (London), LXViII, 270, January I969, pp. 4-25. the majority. In addition, the other classes had to be evaluated and
utilised in terms of the peasantry, whose thinking is 'pure' and un-
hampered by the inconsistency and compromise of the urban pro-
letariat and bourgeoisie. For Fanon, even in the post-revolutionary
society the peasants must be central and pivotal; when they become
the politically decisive arm of the revolution the nation will become a
living reality to all its citizens.
Like Fanon, Cabral recognised the importance of the peasants
because their very numbers provided the main strength of the opposi-
tion to foreign domination. Experience taught the P.A.I.G.C. that the
rural masses would 'be the principal force in the struggle for national
liberation '. Also, more than other groups, they have kept their culture
and identity intact. But the peasants in Guinea-Bissau proved to be
most difficult to convince that they were being exploited. Therefore,
although the struggle must be based upon the peasants, Cabral did not
see them as a revolutionary force per se. Here he distinguished between
a physical force, which the peasants are, and a revolutionary force,
which they are not. Admittedly, they comprise most of the population,
control most of the nation's wealth, and do most of the producing. But
to convince them to fight was difficult because, unlike in China, the
peasants of Guinea-Bissau had no tradition of revolt and therefore did
not welcome the revolutionists readily.2 Thus, Fanon and Cabral both
saw the peasants as perhaps central to any African revolutionary
movement although, as we shall see, unable to lead a revolution them-
selves. Where they differed, however, was in the relative faith each had
in the peasants: Fanon saw them as a spontaneous revolutionary force,
whereas for Cabral they were a vital, but difficult to persuade, physical
force.
The two men also differed concerning the roles played by the pro-
letariat and the lumpenproletariat. (Since they did not consider them-
selves Marxists, it is doubtful that they used these words, along with
'bourgeoisie', because they believed in them. Rather, it is suspected,
they employed them symbolically as a basis for comparison with
European revolutionary theory and because they were writing, in
large measure, to a western audience familiar with such terminology.)
The urban or colonial proletariat Cabral preferred to call 'wage-
earners'. Although they were hardly a traditional proletariat, many
became committed to the revolution because, in comparing their
1 Cabral, 'At the United Nations' (1962), in Revolution in Guinea, p. 38. Also see Cabral,
'Identity and Dignity in the National Liberation Struggle', in Africa Today, xix, 4, Fall 1972,
P. 47.
2 Cabral, 'Brief Analysis of the Social Structure', p. 6I.

CONTRAST IN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION FOR AFRICA I99
status to that of European workers doing the same job but earning
more, they developed a consciousness of their exploitation.1 They are a
'little proletariat' and helped to make up the backbone of the revolu-
tion. Nevertheless, the cities themselves are strongholds of colonialism,
and revolutionary activity there must be of a limited and clandestine
nature.2 Fanon, however, had absolutely no use for the colonial pro-
letariat; in fact, he was contemptuous towards African workers who, he
insisted, were like the bourgeoisie in industrial countries: a favoured
class. 'In the colonial territories the proletariat is the nucleus of the
colonized population which has been most pampered by the colonial
regime.'3 They were in a 'comparatively privileged position', and thus
reluctant to attack a system which both created them and guaranteed
their existence. 'In the colonial countries the working class has every-
thing to lose; in reality it represents that fraction of the colonized
nation which is necessary and irreplaceable if the colonial machine is to
run smoothly.'4 To rely on the proletariat, said Fanon, is to try to
transpose European conditions on Africa.
Fanon and Cabral are equally far apart on the question of the
lumpenproletariat. Marx thought this group was incapable of any con-
structive action. Cabral agreed to the extent that they were not to be
trusted because of the assistance they usually give to the colonialists.
But Cabral distinguished between two categories of lumpenproletariat.
He expected nothing from the traditional diclassis, the beggars, prosti-
tutes, pimps, and petty criminals. But the other group of declassis are
those 'young people who are connected to petty bourgeois or workers'
families, who have recently arrived from the rural areas and generally
do not work'.5 This group is astute enough to compare its standard of
living with the colonialists and, with the close relations it has with both
the rural areas and the towns, has the potential for revolutionary
consciousness.
Fanon did not draw a similar distinction between categories of
lumpenproletariat. After beginning in the countryside, he said, the African
revolution would filter into the towns through the lumpenproletariat,
'that fraction of the peasant population which is blocked on the outer
1 Ibid. pp. 62 f.
2 Cabral, 'At the United Nations', p. 37. 3 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. Io8.
4 Ibid. p. 109. Fanon's position on the proletariat, especially in its relationship with the
peasantry, has made subject to criticism by Marxists. See Nguyen Nghe, 'Frantz Fanon et les
problemes de l'independence', in LaPensde (Paris), I07, February 1963, pp. 22-36; andJack
Woddis, Jew Theories of Revolution: a commentary on the views of Frantz Fanon, Rdgis Debray, and
Herbert Marcuse (New York, 1972), pp. 25-175. 5 Cabral, 'Brief Analysis of the Social Structure', p. 59. fringe of the urban centers, that fraction which has not yet succeeded
in finding a bone to gnaw in the colonial system'. Once politicised this
group would be the 'urban spearhead' of the revolution. 'For the
lumpenproletariat, that horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe
and from their clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneous and the
most radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people.'l Unlike
Cabral's more precise analysis, Fanon's discussion here is highly
romanticised. He expected 'the pimps, the hooligans, the unemployed
and the petty criminals ... all the hopeless dregs of humanity' to be
able to 'recover their balance, once more go forward, and march
proudly in the great procession of the awakened nation'.2
The final class to be evaluated by both men as they formulated their
theories of revolution was the bourgeoisie (i.e. the merchants, business-
men, civil servants, professional people, and a few agricultural land-
owners). To Fanon it was a useless, parasitical class, not even a true
bourgeoisie, but a 'greedy caste, avid and voracious ... It remembers
what it has read in European textbooks and imperceptibly it becomes
not even a replica of Europe, but its caricature.'3 And unlike in Euro-
pean countries, the bourgeois phase in the history of underdeveloped
countries is a useless one, not even promoting an economy to make a
socialist revolution possible. The national middle class which takes over
power at the end of the revolution is underdeveloped itself, and is in
no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country. It
is engaged neither in production, building, nor labour. 'It is completely
canalized into activities of the intermediary type. Its innermost vocation
seems to be to keep in the running and to be part of the racket.'4
Because the national bourgeoisie
is strung up to defend its immediate interests ... sees no further than the end
of its nose, [and] reveals itself incapable of simply bringing national unity
into being, or of building up the nation on a stable and productive basis ...
[it] should not be allowed to find the conditions necessary for its existance
and growth.5
The bourgeoisie only tries to replace the colonial class that had been
removed by the revolution, whereas for Fanon the aim is to redistribute
the productive energies of the nation, not to substitute black bourgeoisie
for white.
Fanon wrote that the bourgeoisie must betray its classical role and
not act like selfish, national bourgeoisie; it must think of the nation
1 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 129.
2 Ibid. p. 130. 3 Ibid. p. 175.
4 Ibid. p. 150. 5 Ibid. pp. I59 and 174f.

CONTRAST IN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION FOR AFRICA 201
above itself and join with the revolutionary forces 'to repudiate its own
nature in so far as it is bourgeois, that is to say in so far as it is the tool
of capitalism, and to make itself the willing slave of that revolutionary
capital which is the people'. But Fanon was not hopeful that the bour-
geoisie would 'follow this heroic, positive, fruitful, and just path;
rather, it disappears with its soul set at peace into the shocking ways
... of a traditional bourgeoisie'.1 Therefore, it must be replaced since
by exploiting the country it is endangering the future.
Fanon resented the national bourgeoisie for another reason. As a
pan-Africanist he was ambivalent towards nationalism which he viewed
as a tool of liberation only. He wanted revolution to overflow national
boundaries to create a new humanism in all of Africa. But the national
bourgeoisie, he feared, put obstacles in the path of his dream. 'This is
why we must understand that African unity can only be achieved
through the upward thrust of the people, and under the leadership of
the people, that is to say, in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisie.'2
Cabral saw the same alternative facing the bourgeoisie - i.e. joining
the revolution or betraying it - but he expected different results.
Fanon's 'national bourgeoisie' is Cabral's 'native petty bourgeoisie'.
This group emerges out of foreign domination and is indispensible to
the system of colonial exploitation. It stands midway between the
masses and the local representatives of the foreign ruling class. Even
though it is native, the petty bourgeoisie strives to be like the foreign
minority and become integrated with them. But the colonial system
is such, observes Cabral, that this is impossible. Those of the African
middle class 'do not succeed in overcoming the barriers thrown up by
the system. They are prisoners of the social and cultural contradictions
of their lives. They cannot escape their role as a marginal class.'3 The
petty bourgeoisie is the class which inherits power as a result of their
European education and service to the colonial regime; their role in
the African bureaucracy is indispensable. From this situation a feeling
of bitterness and frustration develops which leads to them questioning
their marginal status and rediscovering their identity. This group
among the petty bourgeoisie (as opposed to those committed to, or
compromised with, colonialism) is the only one capable of leading the
revolution, since the peasants are a non-revolutionary force and the
working class is in an embryo state.
The revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must then return to the masses
Ibid. p. 150.
2 Ibid. p. I64.
3 Cabral, 'Identity and Dignity', p. 4

and completely identify with them. This process is slow and uneven,
with many among the bourgeoisie being indecisive. But it is only
through the struggle that they can hope to identify with the masses;
from the African bourgeoisie there arises 'the first important step
toward mobilizing and organizing the masses for the struggle'.' With
the success of the struggle the petty bourgeoisie must continue to lead.
'The moment national liberation comes and the petty bourgeoisie
takes power we enter, or rather return to history, and thus the internal
contradictions break out again.'2 When this happens 'the petty
bourgeoisie can either ally itself with imperialism and the reactionary
strata in its own country to try and preserve itself as a petty bourgeoisie
or ally itself with the workers and peasants'.3 This, finally, means that
for the petty bourgeoisie to fulfil its r6le in the revolution it 'must be
capable of committing suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revo-
lutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations
of the people to which they belong'.4 This, said Cabral, is the dilemma
of the petty bourgeoisie in the struggle. It is also the fulcrum upon
which turns the success of the revolution.
Thus, although both men could agree on the nature of the dilemma
facing the indigenous bourgeoisie, the results of their respective analyses
pointed in opposite directions. Fanon's bourgeoisie would fail the
revolution and try to use the struggle for its own selfish ends; other
groups would have to ensure the success of the struggle. But Cabral's
bourgeoisie, in sufficient numbers, would- no, must -join forces with
the masses, and become reincarnated in the condition of workers and
peasants to bring about a successful revolution. This is one of the most
important differences between their theories.
PARTIES AND LEADERSHIP
Lenin made a distinctive contribution to the theory and practice of
revolution when he substituted party for class as the motive force. The
party, he said, showed the masses the way.5 Virtually all revolutionary
theorists since then have utilised Lenin, in one way or another, in their
analyses of parties and leadership. Fanon and Cabral each recognised
Ibid. p. 47.
2 Cabral, 'Brief Analysis of the Social Structure', p. 69.
8 Ibid. p. 70.
4 Cabral, 'The Weapon of Theory', p. x o.
6 For a discussion and evaluation of Lenin's theory on, and contribution to, the concept of
revolution, as well as those of others, see Robert Blackey and Clifford T. Paynton, Revolution
and the Revolutionary Ideal (Cambridge, Mass., forthcoming)

CONTRAST IN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION FOR AFRICA 203
the value of efficient leaders for a successful revolution but, as with the
other factors we have surveyed, there are both similarities and dif-
ferences in their considerations.
Fanon, as emphasised above, recognised the conservative nature of
the peasants, as well as their potential for collective and spontaneous
violent action. But peasants lack adequate intellectual leadership
without which the revolution would fail. Such leadership, according to
Fanon, will come from the revolutionary elite in the cities who other-
wise have no base for action. It is crucial for revolutionary leaders to
intervene at the precise moment when peasant hostility erupts against
the colonial force. With outside leadership, momentum can be main-
tained and the insurrection of the peasants can be transformed into a
revolution.' Thus, Fanon hoped to turn peasant violence into an angry
awareness of injustices by merging it with revolutionary leadership.
When peasant revolts occur it is the duty of revolutionary leaders to
move in and direct them.
What Fanon found wrong with most national political parties in
colonial countries was that they were reformist and alienated from the
peasants. He opposed single-party regimes as 'the modern form of the
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted, unscrupulous,
and cynical'.2 Instead, he urged the more radical and militant members
of those national parties to join with the peasants, and together become
the basis for the political organisation of the revolution. Although he
was not especially specific regarding this organisation, he did develop
the idea of a minority or illegal party, composed of the urban radicals
acting as the ideological vanguard and the masses as their numerical
base.3 This illegal party, then, is led by deviant nationalists who have
reacted against the enclosed character and limited nature of the tradi-
tional national party. They are pushed out of the city to the countryside
where they discover that the peasants, unlike the urban proletariat, are
not indifferent. In this way the role of the peasants in the illegal party
is crucial; the party is the product of the fusion of the peasants with
the urban revolutionary elite (to which the galvanised lumpenproletariat
are later added).
Perhaps because he was in more of a central leadership role in his
revolution than Fanon was in Algeria, Cabral employed greater pre-
cision in discussing the role of party and leadership. Like Fanon he
shared a fear of elites but the P.A.I.G.C. had a real structure that
i Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 'Spontaneity: its strength and weakness', passim.
2 Ibid. p. I65.
3 Ibid. pp. 125-8.

Fanon's vaguer illegal party lacked. 'In our circumstances the Party
equals the State because there is no other means of making the State a
truly national, truly liberating organism',1 wrote Cabral. He sought a
government that would emerge during the struggle, grow from village
roots, and avoid the perils of becoming a privileged minority or an
oligarchical network. 'The Party is the people', said Cabral. 'For us
the people's opinion ... is extremely important, because the Party is
fighting for the people.'2 Cabral's study of the social structure of his
country indicated that for victory to be achieved all the groups of
Guinea-Bissau would have to be united, and not just Fanon's peasants,
lumpenproletariat, and urban leadership. Therefore, one of the primary
functions of the P.A.I.G.C. would be to minimise the conflicts and
contradictions among the various groups and classes making up the
struggle. Only a politically aware, revolutionary party can distinguish
between true national independence and fictitious political indepen-
dence, and then make it known, through the struggle, to the masses.3
During the struggle, liberated areas must be organised so that
colonial rule can be replaced effectively. Autonomous regions must be
eliminated to prevent local potentates from exercising power, selfishly,
over the people. Everything must be tied to the party's central organisa-
tion, with military leadership a part of (and not separate from, nor
superior to) the political. But military effectiveness is vital because the
revolutionists must show the masses that they are at least as powerful as
the colonial army; otherwise they might lose the support of the masses.
Therefore, the party must also train and organise forces to follow-up
the political groundwork. Simultaneously, care must be taken to keep
the guerrillas in contact with the masses and to encourage local
participation. All this is the task of the party for Cabral.
REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE
Fanon is probably best known for his views on violence and revo-
lution, a subject about which there is considerable debate.4 Although
he was not especially consistent in his pronouncements on violence,
1 Quoted in Davidson, op. cit. p. 138.
2 Quoted in Chaliand, op. cit. p. 68.
3 Cabral, 'The Weapon of Theory', p. 105.
4 See A. Norman Klein, 'On Revolutionary Violence', in Studies On The Left (New York),
vi, 3, 1966, pp. 62-82; Barbara Deming, 'On Revolution and Equilibrium', in Liberation
(London), xII, I, February 1968, pp. I0-2I; Louis Coser, 'Fanon and Debray: theorists
of the Third World', in Irving Howe (ed.), Beyond the New Left (New York, 1970); Horace
Sutton, 'Fanon', in Saturday Review (New York), 17 July I97I; Gendzier, op. cit.; and

CONTRAST IN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION FOR AFRICA 205
much of what he said can be understood if all of his views are considered.
Cabral's thoughts on the subject were somewhat similar, although he
was not as preoccupied with violence as Fanon.
During the revolutionary process of seizing freedom, violence,
according to Fanon, is necessarily applied because the very structure of
colonialism is fundamentally violent.
Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously,
a program of complete disorder . . . [Colonialism] is violence in its natural
state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence.l
Decolonisation involves 'vomiting up' foreign values and this pro-
duces new men. Through violence Africans come to realise that the
colonialists are no different from themselves, that their lives and their
skins are the same. This discovery, according to Fanon, 'shakes the
world in a very necessary manner. All the new, revolutionary assurance
of the natives stems from it.'2 Thus, violence 'makes it possible for the
masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without
the struggle . . . there's nothing but ... [the masses], still living in the
middle ages.'3 Violence and revolution are not only rewards in them-
selves, but means to a greater end as well.
Yet, Fanon admitted that other means may be appropriate if the
situation dictates it. 'If need be, the native can accept a compromise
with colonialism, but never a surrender of principle.'4 A colonised
people must win their war of liberation, he insisted, 'but they must do
so cleanly, without "barbarity" . . . The underdeveloped nation that
practices torture thereby confirms its nature, plays the role of an under-
developed people.'5 The rest of the world, in order to accept a colonised
nation setting itself up as an independent nation, must see the colonised
people, in every one of its acts, as lucid and self-controlled.
Because we believe one cannot rise and liberate oneself in one area and sink
in another, we condemn, with pain in our hearts, those brothers who have
flung themselves into revolutionary action with the almost physiological
brutality that centuries of oppression gave rise to.6
An explanation for this apparent inconsistency may lie in the North
African context in which Fanon found himself, and in the emotional
nature of much of his writing. In Algeria the French were deeply
entrenched with a large colon or settler population, and were determined
to hold on, whatever the cost; the Algerian revolutionists had no
1 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 36 and 6i.
2 Ibid. p. 45. 3 Ibid. p. I47.
4 Ibid. p. I43. 5 Fanon, A Dying Colonialism (New York edn., I965), p. 24.

alternative to violence. Therefore, when Fanon wrote of violence as 'a
cleansing force . . [freeing] the native from his despair and inaction',l
he was probably referring to Algeria only; he was not celebrating
violence per se. In-fact, he acknowledged that while 'in Algeria the test
of force was inevitable . . other countries through political action and
through the work of clarification undertaken by a party have led their
people to the same results'.2 Thus, Fanon wrote only of a reactive
violence that was an integral part of justice and non-compromise.
Cabral did not devote very much attention to violence, though like
Fanon he realised that it was the essential instrument of imperialist
domination. Revolution and national liberation, he believed, cannot
occur
without the use of liberating violence by the nationalist forces, to answer the
criminal violence of the agents of imperialism . . . Imperialist domination
implies a state of permanent violence against the nationalist forces. There
is no people on earth which, having been subjected to the imperialist yoke
(colonialist or neo-colonialist), has managed to gain its independence
(nominal or effective) without victims.3
Violence needs to be used not only in response to the violence of
imperialism, but also to ensure true national independence. Com-
promises with imperialism, as experience taught Cabral, do not work.
But, as opposed to the French in Algeria, who were well settled, there
have been other colonialists who have not been interested in establishing
that kind of colony. Therefore, in such a situation, as in Guinea-
Bissau with the Portuguese, terrorism need not be employed. A military
struggle is often enough.4
ROLE OF CULTURE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
As with most of the components of revolution we have considered,
especially where the two theorists tend to share similar ideas, Cabral
was more organised and attentive to detail than Fanon. But when both
men defined the role of culture in a revolutionary situation, and
speculated about the future, the differences between them are less pro-
nounced. Each employed more generalisations than usual- though
Cabral still less than Fanon - and each was essentially optimistic.
One of the greatest evils of colonialism, according to Fanon, is that
'it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures,
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 94.
2 Ibid. p. I93.
3 Cabral, 'The Weapon of Theory', p. Io7.
4 Cabral, 'Practical Problems and Tactics', p. 135


CONTRAST IN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION FOR AFRICA 207
and destroys it'. It warns Africans that if the settlers depart then they
'would at once fall back into barbarism, degradation, and bestiality'.1
Colonialism had 'generously' lightened their darkness. But this negative
situation can only be countered when the native turns backwards
towards his unknown roots - then he 'turns himself into the defender of
his people's past; he is willing to be counted as one of them, and hence-
forth he is even capable of laughing at his past cowardice'.2 The purpose
of culture is to utilise the past to open the future, to be an invitation to
action and a basis for hope. 'To fight for national culture means ... to
fight for the liberation of the nation, the material keystone which
makes the building of a culture possible. There is no other fight for
culture which can develop apart from the popular struggle.'3 Thus,
culture aims not only to counteract the evils of colonialism but to
construct the future.
A national culture is the whole body of efforts made by a people in the sphere
of thought to describe, justify, and praise the action through which that
people has created itself and keeps itself in existence. A national culture in
underdeveloped countries should therefore take its place at the very heart
of the struggle for freedom which these countries are carrying on.4
Culture is a vital part of a people's identity in its struggle for freedom.
Cabral agreed. In fact, he went so far as to assert that it is impossible
to create and develop a revolution unless a people keep their culture
alive in the face of continued organised repression of their way of life.
'It is cultural resistance which at a given moment can take on new
forms - political, economic, military-to fight foreign domination.'5
Cabral further observed that in the colonial situation the cultural
influence of the imperial power is limited to the capital and other
urban centres, and then only to small numbers of petty bourgeoisie and
urban workers. As for the masses, they are either completely or almost
untouched by the culture of the colonial power. Since foreigners are not
even interested in promoting culture for the masses, the latter, in turn,
'find that their own culture acts as a bulwark in preserving their
identity'.6
The future, to Fanon's mind, would be bright. Every victory in the
revolutionary struggle 'is a defeat for racism and for the exploitation
of man ... [inaugurating] the unconditional reign of Justice'.7 Fanon
1 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 21 of.
2 Ibid. p. 2I8. 3 Ibid. p. 233. 4 Ibid. 5 Cabral, 'Identity and Dignity', pp. 40f.
6 Ibid. p. 41.
7 Fanon, 'Algeria Face to Face with the French Torturers' (1957), in Toward the Africa

did not elaborate upon what would happen after the success of the
revolution. His emphasis was on redistribution rather than upon
material creation. Moreover, he viewed the struggle for liberation as
part of a larger African-wide movement for a democratic and social
revolution. But in pursuing this goal, Fanon warned, none of the
African nations could afford to imitate western and capitalistic ways
of life; in fact, none should dare imitate the West because it would only
lead to a similar moral and spiritual debasement. He tried to minimise
the differences between Arab Africa and Black Africa because they, as
well as the other divisions of the continent, in no way reflected tribal
differences, geographic realities, or economic and social factors. They
were, instead, the 'gift' of Europe to Africa. Fanon believed that
common interests should bring Africans together in order to 'try to set
afoot a new man'.1
Cabral also believed in looking to the future, beyond the struggle for
national liberation, to the economic, social, and cultural evolution of
the people on their road to progress. He, too, opposed 'narrow national-
isms which do not serve the true interests of the people' and favoured
instead an 'African unity, on a regional or continental scale, inasfar as
it is necessary for the progress of the African peoples'.2 Although he
expected tribal differences to disappear with the success of the struggle
as they were absorbed by the new social order, he still recognised that
everyday conditions must also be changed. The most important thing
of all, he said, 'is an understanding of our people's situation . . .We
must assure [them] that those who bear arms are sons of the people and
that arms are no better than the tools of labor.'3 The purpose and goal
of the revolution is to protect the man with the tool.
EPITAPH
Fanon was more concerned with making the revolution than with
predicting the future in much detail. His writings were intended to be a
part of the war against colonialism and imperialism. He saw hope for
Africa in all the people of the continent coming to grips with the
problems of unity and solidarity, so that they could collectively pursue
the best interests of all concerned, especially those of the masses, in the
quest for total liberation. Fanon was a brilliant propagandist of revolu-
tion, a prophet of hope for the oppressed.
1 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 316.
2 Cabral, 'Guinea and Cabo Verde Against Portuguese Colonialism', p. 17.
3 Quoted in Chaliand, op. cit. p. 35

CONTRAST IN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION FOR AFRICA 209
Less emotional than Fanon, Cabral was also a prophet of hope. He,
too, was primarily concerned with making the revolution, but he
placed it under the microscope of analysis in a way Fanon did not.
More than any other revolutionist in this century, with the exception of
Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, Cabral lived, breathed, and thought through
his people's revolution as a unique event. He was laying down a
cardinal principle when he said that 'it is necessary for each people to
find its own formula for mobilizing for the struggle'.l Each country
entering upon a path of revolution must look to its own internal con-
tradictions and problems.
Our own reality - however fine and attractive the reality of others may be -
can only be transformed by detailed knowledge of it, by our own efforts, by
our own sacrifices . . . However great the similarity between our various
cases and however identical our enemies, national liberation and social
revolution are not exportable commodities.2
He was a high-principled but practical and far-sighted revolutionist.
In lieu of Cabral's advice no conclusion that unequivocably decides
in favour of either revolutionist would be in order. Fanon, to be sure,
is the better known and more widely read. His words pound on the
doors of consciences; what he says comes from the heart and swells the
body to action. But Fanon, as we have observed, is sometimes con-
tradictory and his generalisations often lack supportive evidence.
However valuable Fanon may be, he should not be taken as the sole
guide for the African revolution. Cabral is more an excellent companion
than an alternative, while their differences can be overcome by follow-
ing his advice to find the proper formula for a given situation.
Both Fanon and Cabral fell victim to a cancer, the former to the
kind medical science is attempting to conquer, the latter to the variety
for which revolution seeks a cure. The differences in their theories of
revolution are important to evaluate, but it must also be noted that
they were seeking a similar future for their people.
1 Cabral, 'Practical Problems and Tactics', pp. 159f.
2 Cabral, 'The Weapon of Theory', p. 92.